Forts

it would likewise, were he to establish a similar post at Cudawy, Mangapoor, or Tengricotta (vide Geographical Nº 1) cut off all communication between the southern and northern districts. It is nearly 43 miles north of Salem; 30 north east of Caverypoorum, 19 east of Penagut; 35 South east of Woory dooroog; 18 north west by north of Veerabuddroog; 31 South of Kishnagerry and 96 south west of Arnee. These distances being the nearest plats in every direction on our side Tippoo possessions with reference to its being the center of the two principal cross roads, mark sufficiently, the vast importance of its situation, to him, or to us, for a post. Were it 7 miles more northward it would perhaps be nearer the center of intersection, and within one march for a detachment from Kishnagerry, but it would be less in the route from Caverypoorum or Penagra, and hardly within two marches of Salem. Those objections are more forcible against Carrimungalum or Paloda, particularly the latter it being 7 miles off the south and north road entirely out of that to Penagra or Caverypoorum.

72 Under all the circumstances recited in favor of Dorampoory or its vicinity, it is a subject of regret that it cannot be easily made a tenable post, and that such as it is, I have no draught, or other aid to memory, in forming a true judgement of its capability. Such as it is a Court hall the eastern of Penagra (Nº 9) and it is nearly of a circular form. It is wholly, excepting the lower hall, built of mud, and the walls of a good

height and thickness, compared with other forts of the same discription; but they are old, and the ditch being shallow, they are intirely exposed to the plain. Were it resolved to erect a fortification in the Baramahl, many points obviously recommend it for situation, and if considered as a mound of earth only, the use of it in the new works, would doubtless save much expence. I do not hesitate the least in recommending that one be built where it is, or near it, for answering the various purposes of an offensive or defensive war instead of fortifying Penagra, Chinny droog, or Veerabuddroog, which might then be demolished; for the inhabitants, preferring the range, and security, which the woods and mountains that surround those places afford, they depend, but in a small degree upon them, for protection; nor would the small parties that could safely be spared from their garrisons, annoy the enemys convoys, or check his predatory excursions, half so much, as a light corps, which might be always upon the move, in a country like the Baramahl, without the least danger of a surprize

Forts

69 Were the requisite additions and repairs given to the parapet of the towers and curtains, and the east and south, made equally strong with the west and north faces, Alston would be a respectable post. and how that could be the easiest done, appears from several considerations, to be worthy of particular enquiry I have provided with plans, sections and other information that must be acquired on the spot, I conclude as I have done, in respect to other places, from observations, unmatured by a competent survey, that how worth, or as less expensive, a new line should be carried on the side of the river opposite to the south face, in the centre of which might be opened a gateway, in the stead of that on the east face. The necessary excavation would form a ditch before the rampart, for the better defence of which, the south west and south east angle bastions might be enlarged. The present gateway, which (projecting without a flanking face to defend it) is the weakest part of the fort, could then be thrown down, and the wall continued on a line, so to make a right face with the rest of the face. The ditch and section works would same be likewise continued parallel to the rampart. The gateway being built of hewn stone, would save much a considerable share of the materials required for these improvements. Locally considered, Alston deserves to be strengthened, but Salem as more central, and other places as more advanced, may demand the earliest attention of government.

70 A powder magazine has been lately built

there

Two 30 feet long, by 15 broad, and a shed 46 by 11, where the powder at present lodged might be converted into a laboratory, at a small expence. The store rooms are four, built of brick and chunam, and all under one roof, which is arched. Their dimensions are 54 feet by 22½; 40 by 21; 42 by 21 and 42½ by 21. 10. These require some repairs. The granaries are three, each nearly 74 feet high, by 20 broad, their lengths severally 22, 31, and 32 feet; their roofs are arched, and they are all of brick and chunam, but likewise in need of repairs, and infested with vermine.

Daramporry

Passing over in this account the several inferior forts that I think should be destroyed to be brought hereafter under one head, weighty reasons induce me to recommend the establishing a post in some centrical situation of the Carnatic, and to suppose, until one more suitable be found, that Daramporry might be converted into one, capable of answering the ends proposed. Noticing before, in my general review, the defenceless state of the centre districts, and the consequent ease with which an enemy might establish himself in them, and draw resources from them, or be followed through them, by his convoys into the Carnatic, this place occurred as one on which he might fix as a rendezvous in them, after passing through the palcode valley or the Canagra district. Being directly on the high road between Changama and Salem

12 by 26, 60 by 8, and 24 by 24 are made use of for
tobacco. A mosque, 26 by 17, and a choultry
10 by 8, are turned into granaries. The command-
er's, as the only public officers quarters, all the Ser-
jeants having hutts houses for themselves.
Three Serjeants quarters were lately built by the
E. government. There also is a barrack for 4
companies, and an hospital, the former of which

Ahtoor

67. This place being on a principal opening
in the range of hills that bounds these districts to the
eastward, and one which with Tiagar, Salem, and
Sankly droog, forms a chain of posts on the short
road from the Carnatic to Tippoor southward, which
which a cooperation with the Bombay troops may
at some future period be necessary, its situation
on that point of view as facilitating our communi-
cations with the Coimbatore districts or those south of
Tippoor, when they may be overrun by the enemy, as
such, without locally considering it as would lead
to the choice of it for a military station. It is
about 170 miles southwest of Madras, 35 west of Tiagar
and 39 east of Salem.

68. Ahtoor stands close upon the north bank
of the river Vaidishty, and from recollection I im-
agine it may be about the extent of Pennagram, but
more broader, and with the opposite sides and
angles more equal. The walls are of stone from
with

with a ravelin, probably, the outside row of fascines is laid on that element, for it is better built than country forts in general, but it has bulged out in some places from age. The rampart also is of a good breadth, compared with other places, and the parapet has been formed with embrazures, in the modern style, but now stands in need, generally, of a thorough repair. It has a few towers inside of the main wall, but adjoining it, half sound upon the rampart, and three or four yards higher than the other works to command the places. I think they are eight in all one at each angle, and one in the middle of each face. The gateway is in the country style, being a projecting work, with several ravelins, the front of it, is low, and accessible, as indeed are all the rest by escalade. The whole except ing the passage to the gate, is surrounded by a wet ditch, and glacis, and three faces by a covert way. The river running very near to the south face, the glacis there is only a kind of dam or fence, to preserve the works from the depredations of the stream, and is inadequate to the purpose, that the south east angle bastion, has been twice washed down by it within these three years. Owing to the breadth of the river, and the lowness of the opposite bank, the south face is quite exposed to view from the plain, on which account Colonel Wood, who took it in the war of 61 attacked it there. The other faces are tolerably covered by the glacis, and the wet ditch is an additional security to them.

Here

42

63 The shape of it will for the same reason be regular by disposition with those of Bramerd and Peragrow. By that it a figure of unequal sides, about 250 paces long, and 230 broad, inside of the rampart. The works are constructed of stone and mud, and in a cautious manner. The ditch is dry, and at some places has a retaining wall.

64 The probability of its keeping predatory parties and even detachments of the enemy at a distance in time of war, may appear a reason for keeping a garrison in Salem, with two or more field pieces and equipped for marching off on the approach of any very considerable force, and while the principal seat of action should be in another quarter it would be of great service. But as the place is not tenable, should such a force appear suddenly before it, the consequence would be ruinous to numbers of its weak, tho' inhabitants, who could not have time to carry their effects along with them. I therefore think, that unless it were put in a state of defence, it would be expedient to withdraw the garrison at the commencement of a war, and encourage the inhabitants to remove to Lanhlidroo, where they would be perfectly secure. Such as would prefer staying at Salem, would, most likely, be provided for by taking themselves in the moment of danger to the hills, which are within a mile of the place.

65 For the several reasons that have appeared in stating the advantageous situation of Salem, generally, it is much to be wished, that it were

rebuilt

Sketch. I apprehend that upon a correct survey being made of it, objections would be found to the ra- -ther of the ground opposite the two faces, near the river, for I have recollection, of having observed, where there, the inclining of them, with the ground on which they stood, and their being consequently exposed to that on the opposite side of the river, which must injure the works, and planes of those faces, to be more than an ordinary height, or an outwork, on the opposite side, either of which would be very expensive. Of that objection, (consisting in the fore shortness to me) can be easily removed, I think that in other respects, Salem is badly situated, that it might be made an excellent post, and without a very great expence, by enlarging the four angle bastions, and joining them by a curtain that curtain, including the small bastions between them, which would give a proper breadth to the rampart. A small channel cut a mile or so above, from the river, would fill the ditch, which should have a good drawing to all the counter scarp, and a covert way. These additions would render it a very tenable post, and it might be made perfectly secure, by means of a caveliar or other outwork on each face

66 It is almost full of inhabitants at present, but by purchasing their ground, sufficient room could be procured for every public accommodation. A stone church, 100 feet by 40, is converted into a magazine, and three other buildings

42

4D

short description, will give a compleat idea of it.
The Fort upon the rock is only 140 feet in length
and 80 in breadth. It is built of stone, and the
name, and is in excellent repair, but has a fault
throughout in all the works, being too small.
It is inaccessible on the west and east sides, but the
two are open to assault, and being only 70 yards com-
in extent, without room for batteries, they could not
sustain an heavy attack. I apprehend likewise from
its smallness, that though there are no command-
ing grounds about it, the garrison could be great-
ly annoyed by ricochet shot. That could be
remedied by giving one additional height and
thickness to the walls, and perhaps still more,
by the lodging a quantity of earth on the top,
which would serve better for traverses than stone
and with a stock of fascines and gabions, for
repairing breaches in the walls, during a siege.
The space of the lower Fort occupied by buildings,
is at an average 400 yards in length, & 250 in
breadth. The wall of it is built of stone and
mud, never was capable of standing cannon shot,
and is now much impaired. Excepting where
it embraces and ascends the rock, it is surrounded
by a ditch, and the defence of it against any
force, without heavy guns (if the garrison consists
of three companies) might I think, from the
necessity, and commanding batteries on the rock,
be undertaken without risque. However the
probability of its becoming the retreat of a great

number

~~number of inhabitants, upon any sudden invasion~~ of that part of the country, requires its being put in a better state of defence.

61 There is very little water on the hill, but the reservoirs there might be enlarged, or cisterns could be made and filled in the approaches of hostilities, which would be sufficient for so small a garrison. There is plenty below. There is a magazine upon the hill, neatly built of brick and chunam, with an arched roof, 15 feet square, and an Ordnance in the lower fort, which is connected with one, 22 by 20. There are three other stone rooms on the hills, 21 by 15, 15 by 12, 15 by 13, and each 10 feet high, nearly. There is a ~~magazine~~ upon the hills, of brick and mud, 20 feet long, 15 broad, and 10 high, and there is an ~~old one~~ in the lower fort, 30 feet long, 15 broad and 12 high. According to a late report of the officer ~~commanding~~ at Arnaud, every accommodation for the troops is wanting there.

Tadoor

62 The situation of this place is equally favorable as the principle emporium of the southern districts, and as a military station, being very centrical, 28 miles North east of Sankladroog, 39 west of Arcot, 26 South east of Tripoor, and 34 north of Arnaud, consequently, but a few miles out of the ordinary route of armies, marching south or north through the ceded districts, and directly on that from the carnatic to Sankladroog

Powder magazines on the top, one of which is an old stone turned bastion, 27 feet by 12½ out of repair, & the other has been lately erected by the contractor, 30 feet by 15, which is arched. The store rooms are all within the lower lines, one of which is 71 feet by 27. Of the rest, which are eleven in number, are each 71½ feet in length, 9 in breadth, and 8 in height. There are four store rooms on the summit, two of which, one 46 by 22.10 and the other 18 feet square, are in repair, but the other measuring 86½ by 22.10, 29 by 21½, and 34 by 12½, are much impaired. There is one more with the 5th Walk, but quite out of repair, 34 feet by 48. There is only one publick quarter, for a captain, the other officers having provided themselves with houses; and a barrack with an hospital, for a battalion, both of which are out of repair.

58 If this place be considered merely as a post for maintaining our possession of the country, the three lower walls may either be destroyed, or suffered to go to ruin, for they give no additional strength to it, the upper three, or two being sufficient for its security. But if thought, that it might eventually be of advantage to have stores advanced, so far, for the conquest of the southern country below the ghauts, or for the siege of Serungapatam, all the lower walls should be put into a thorough state of repair, and strengthened, for the security of the stores and accommodations for the troops, which might with ease be provided within the first and second of them. Two gateways in each of the two lower walls would evidently be necessary

for

for speedy issues of stores, and doubtless a complete survey of the place would suggest many other alterations and improvements. Such a survey being made and the designation of the post determined on, it might then be resolved, if the repairs that have lately been made to the lower fortifications were really necessary, or a useless expenditure of the public money.

Namcul

59 As the number of garrisons must necessarily be very limited, in time of war it may be observed, that the situation of Namcul is such as with a regard to that circumstance, might be chosen, for the protection of the most southern of the united districts, their eastern, southern, and western boundary being equally about 20 m. from it. On the same principle, it is properly situated in respect to other posts, being 34 miles S E from Sankhidroog, and 56 miles N W from Purandhur, consequently on the road between the places. It stands 34 miles due [illegible] from Satara, and 54 south west of Ahdoor. The circumjacent country being very open, it is the only place to forage for the inhabitants, to a great distance round, between it and the Cawery, in time of hostility.

60 Namcul is a fortified rock, inaccessible on three faces, by a wall below and is the least strong post in the country. The accompanying plan of it [illegible]

96

Sankleidroog

55 The cintrical situation of this port, joined to its Local advantages, constituting it, one of the first importance, I shall insert the bearings and distances from it, that I think would be of the most consequence in a war as taken from Captains Beatson and Allens maps, published in 92, allowing 1 mile in 10 for windings.

Erroad	S W	15 miles
Coimatoor	S W	66
Paulcaudcherry	S W	90
The Cavery	W	40
Santmingalam	W	47
Goyel hutty proper	W by S	67
Seringapatam by way of Goyel hutty		131
Cavery proper		23
Seringapatam by way of Cavery proper		119
Periagra	N by E	30
Keargerry		90
Madras by Arkot		227
Cuddalor by Arkot		147
Pitchinopoly		90

Every one of these distances are certainly practicable to armies, as they have been repeatedly marched by them when provided with artillery.

56 To give a compleat Idea of Sankleidroog as a post, would require a complete survey; it being no less remarkable, and a still greater mountain than

o Pycotah.

Ryhotta. Not having any draft, or ascertained the exact figure of it, the natives idea of its resembling a conque shell of which sort it is called Sankhgurry may be adopted. That allowed, it must be supposed the flat side is towards the south, the mouth downward, and within or on into the ground, and the conceal cut off. for there is a considerable space upon the top. The south being the only face accessible, unless by stratagem, it is fortified by six lines of defence, the upper three of which, crossing the hollow part of the imagined shell, are completely defended by them. It particularly by the west part, which projecting beyond the rest of the face, is angularly calculated for its defence, which secures of itself from its front and sides being almost perpendicular. The other three lines being advanced beyond the projecting sides, they are of consequence open to attack, but as at Ryhotta, the batteries upon the mountain would entirely command whatever could be brought against them. These works are mostly built of hewn stone, and though out of repair may be deemed impregnable. From what I recollect the west and east faces are so steep to be quite inaccessible, and the north face is so steep, that two three walls at some distance, for precaution, or surprize, have been deemed sufficient for its security.

57 There is enough of room, and water on the top, for every purpose, but the way ups, is so far, so steep and difficult, as precludes the use of the lots, excepting for the garrison; but there is likewise sufficient of both within the three lower fortifications. There are two

grand routes of armies; the former being in that by which they have hitherto infested the Baramahl, in an east and west direction, and the latter in that which they would take, in marching south or north. But should Tippoo come direct from his capital, through the Caveryporeum pass, to enter that district, Penagra would then become the first object of the war, because all the other roads in the vicinity of caveryporeum being impassable for guns he would necessarily march against it, and it would as surely fall to him, if not very speedily relieved. It is however, more likely, that he will come by any other route, than that as us, the practicability of going to his capital by so short a road. While therefore we do not indicate any such intention, Penagra, may remain unrevetted, and exceptiong such a design were formed, it may appear advisable, the remote situation of it considered, to beat the expence of any additional works to it, for until then, our having found it a post, will be more the reason of our making it one than the purposes to which it will be converted.

53 On the other hand, were it resolved to invade Mysore, that war, by the Caveryporeum pass, which by all accounts has been the route of armies in former times, Penagra would become a very important place, from its being directly in the road, its being so much advanced, and its having so much work on it, that it might eventually be converted into a depot. On all these accounts it would appear expedient to

make

make it a place of strength and though / as I have mentioned / the present works are ill calculated for em bracement, and the ground about it is rather unfa vourable, it could probably be done at no great expence by enlarging the five angle bastions, constructing two ravelins, one on the west, & the other on the east face to cover two new gateways: by shortning up the gateway to the southward and securing the whole by enlarging, and deepening, the ditch, which would furnish earth for raising a glacis to cover the works all round, effectually. The height of the present works might be reduced, so to be sufficiently covered by a glacis, at the less expence, and the parapet thickened as much as the small bastions and narrow rampart would admit for musquetry; but the batteries which could be erected upon the new works proposed, would constitute the main strength of the place.

54 The public buildings on it are, two powder magazines, arched, of brick and chunam, 15 feet square, a store room, likewise new, and of the same materials, 58 by 15, but with a tiled roof, and three are three granaries; one is a square mud house 78 feet by 14, and the other two are circular mud houses, 21½ and 27½ feet in diameter, each 13 feet in height which altogether would contain 87 garce but they are all infested by vermine There are likewise quarters for 1 Captain, 3 Subalterns, a barrack, and an hospital for a battalion, but all of them are out of repair.

forming two tracts, one of which before described as the Policode valley, extends north west, and the other comprising the Penagra district, extends south west are separated by a jut of the Mysore country in the shape of a leg and foot, as appears in the map No 1. There is a material difference between them, the ascent of the Policode valley being the same with that of the Baramahl in general, which places it below the hills on either side, and the ascent of the Penagra district being so much greater, that the country on both sides is below it and hills excepted, it is the highest land in our possession. Save to the eastward it is encompassed by a hilly, and woody country, which descends to the westward till intersected by the Cavery, and to the northward till it meets with a small river, which passes through a part of the Policode valley, and at last joins the Cavery; but there are riddes from it, in almost every direction. The Fort of Penagra stands in a corner of the district, being 4 miles from the boundary to the westward, and 2 from it to the northward. It is 8 miles to the nearest part of the Cavery, probably 20 to the defile which called the Caverepoorum pass, 100 from Seringapatam, and from Arnee.

51 When there, I took an imperfect sketch of it by means of a pocket compass, and pacing only of which No 9 is a copy. That shews it to be oblong, of unequal sides, with a projecting work upon the southwest, another upon the southeast angle, in the last of which is its only gateway; also, that

taking

taking its greatest extent, it is 360 yards or paces in length, and 210 in breadth. It is built of stone and mud. Other occupations prevented my taking any sections of the works, but I judge, from recollection, that the walls may be generally, about 25 feet high outside, the parapet 4 in thickness, the rampart 12 in breadth, and the ditch, which is dry, may be reasonably, between 20 and 30 yards in width. The bastions are too small to admit of a proper thickness to the parapet. From the want of glacis the wall is every where much exposed. From its standing upon a plain inclined to the southward, I think it is commanded from that quarter, as well as from the northward, and westward, where of course the ground is higher outside than within. The petta which is rather larger, is situated half a mile to the westward, and is encompassed by a thin hedge, that might enable a few guards to protect it against struggling Slaves.

52 The weakness of this place was soon discovered by Colonel Maxwell's successful attempt upon it by escalade, in open day. Though any native power could not take it from us, without first breaching it, the construction and materials, of the works, are such, that a few light ordnance, might soon effect the demolition of them. Since therefore Pensacola would soon fall to any considerable force, its greatest security, while in its present state, appears to consist in, the improbability of our going against it, on account of its being 18, or 20 miles, from Pensacola, or Barrancas, the nearest place in the

53 possession

forming two tracts, one of which, before described as the Polode valley, extends northwest, and the other composing the Penagra district, extends southwest, are separated by a part of the Mysore country in the shape of a leg and foot, as appears on the map No 1. There is a material difference between them, the ascent of the Polode valley being the same with that of the Baramahl in general, which places it below the hills on either side, and the ascent of the Penagra district being so much greater, that the country on both sides is below it and hills excepted, it is the highest land in our possession. Due to the eastward it is encompassed by a hilly, and woody country, which descends to the westward till intersected by the Cavery, and to the northward, till it meets with a small river, which passes through a part of the Polode valley, and at last joins the Cavery; but there are roades from it, in almost every direction. The Fort of Penagra stands in a corner of the district, being 4 miles from the boundary to the westward, and 2 from it to the northward. It is 8 miles to the nearest part of the Cavery, probably 20 to the defile which is called the Caveripooram pass, 100 from Seringapatam, and from Arnee.

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taking

Fort

taking its greatest extent, it is 360 yards or paces in length, and 210 in breadth. It is built of stone and mud. Other occupations prevented my taking any sections of the works, but I judge from recollection, that the walls may be generally about 25 feet high outside, the parapet 4 in thickness the rampart 12 in breadth, and the ditch, which is dry, may be generally between 20 and 30 yards in width. The bastions are too small to admit of a proper thickness to the parapet. From the want of glacis the wall is every where much exposed. From its standing upon a plain inclined to the southward, I think it is commanded from that quarter, as well as from the northward, and westward, where of course the ground is higher outside than within. The Castle which is rather larger, is situated Sally or more to the westward, and is encompassed by a thin hedge, that might enable a few guards to protect it against shuggling shot.

52 The weakness of this place was soon discovered by Colonel Maxwell's successful attempt upon it by escalade, one dark day. Though any native power could not take it from us, without first breaching it, the construction and materials of the works are such, that a few light ordnances might soon effect the demolition of them. Since there the Pearagon would soon fall to any considerable force, its greatest security, while in its present state, appears to consist in the improbability of our going against it, on account of its being 18 or 20 miles from Calicut, or Cannanore, the nearest places in the

Gerard

by either, he would certainly prefer that to the eastward. On that account Chinroydroog was made a post. It is two miles from the boundary, 6 north east of Hoorydroog, and by a direct road, or footway through the hills, 5 south west of Ryhatta

48 It is a small rock, quite bluff, and inaccessible on the east and west faces, very difficult of ascent to the southward, and though easy of ascent to the northward, it can hardly be entered on that face, except through a cleft on the nth, on which is, its only gateway. Owing to these natural advantages, or to its insignificance as a post, untill now, it has no other defences, than a single mud wall round the top, which is generally between one and two feet thick, and that is very old, and decayed. By the engineers report, the gateway has been rebuilt lately. There has likewise erected there, a powder magazene, of brick and chunam, and arched, 15 feet long, 15 broad, and 13½ in height also a store room of brick, and mud, tiled, of 21 by 15 and 11 in height. There are no accommodations for troops upon the hill, this only quarter being one in the pettah, which was built by an officer who commanded there, and the only granaries consist of a gola or round thatched building above, 25 feet in diameter, an old mud house below, infested with vermine, both of which would contain about 57 garce. There is not much water on the hill, but enough may certainly be always collected in the monsoons, for its garrison.

49 This hill is surrounded by other smaller

ences, without guns [illegible] by which, one to the southward, and one to the northward are nearly as high, and must, I imagine, be within 800 yards of it. Being so near, it is evident, that were batteries erected upon them, the place being so small, and without fortifications, the garrison would have no cover, and were an invasion to be made by this route, that the reduction of Chumpong would be the enemys first object in the war. From these reasons I am of opinion, that unless it be so fortified, and provided to stand a siege, it should be considered as a post to be evacuated upon the enemys approaching it in force, and that farther expence, or the erecting any publick buildings upon it, will otherwise be a useless expenditure. Its very advanced situation being convenient for a beacon, and the narrowness of the valley where it is are points in favor of its being continued as a post, but its being too small to hold a garrison sufficient for intercepting convoys with ease, or accommodations for detachments, its not commanding the pass as was imagined, and the short distance it is from Ryhola, are arguments against it. Conceiving it would only be necessary to fortify the south, and north faces, I apprehend the expence of making it a tenable post would be inconsiderable, but that can only be determined by a proper military survey, shewing particularly its situation, figure, extent, and all the circumstances connected with the attack & defence of it

Tenagra

but the three upper flats would very probably be found sufficient, which could save more than half the expence required to put them in a proper state of defence. As already shewn the lower works would not enclose much room, that could be dispensed, nor would it, in my opinion be needed, if any additional strength to those above. I shall therefore suppose hereafter that the upper ones only will be fortified.

46 In that event, all that has been done to the fortifications there, has been unnecessary. The first and second lines of defence, and some of the batteries, have been repaired, new gateways are constructing at D, and O, the passage leading into the third line, which are not calculated for a draught, and walls to the powder magazines, in the passage, which I propose to exclude the new fortifications, have been rebuilt. Hence as I have early observed on this subject, the purposes which a post is capable of answering, and the intention of government respecting it, should determine, as to its additions or repairs, and if all my opinions, and suppositions, regarding Pyhota, be admitted, what has been done there, evinces the effect of acting contrary to that maxim, and setting to work upon a part only, previous to the viewing and considering well "The whole together." Having closed this tedious survey, which I hope from its obvious utility, will be extended, I shall give such sketches of other places as I can, from recollection & the imperfect materials in my possession, taking those first which are the most advanced as I shall

shall, afterwards, make their ordnance, stores, garrisons accommodations, provisions &c. the several subjects of consideration.

Chinnydroog

41 This post deriving its only importance from its situation, I shall be the more particular in describing it, and refer to the map No 1, for some idea of it. The principal pass or opening from the Mysore country into the Baramahl, is a tract, lying nearly northwest and southeast, about 20 miles in length, and in general between 3 and 10 in breadth which may be called the Palicode valley, that plain lying in the southeast, or lower end of it, where it is only 5 miles broad. It is a very level open country about two thirds of its length, where it is bounded by a triangular hilly tract, near the hither angle of which stands, Chinnydroog, and in the other angles of which are, Raykota before mentioned, and Hoory droog, a fort of Tippoos, which two places, make the upper extremes of the valley Owing to this intermediate tract, there are two defiles into it. The westermost, passing immediately under the guns of Hoory droog, is entirely commanded by it, and tho rather steep, was made an excellent road by Hyder The other which is rather a valley of itself than a defile, is of a gradual ascent, was repaired by our pioneers in 92, and is too distant from Rayhota to be under the command of its guns. From its proximity, however to that place, and from Hoory droog being more in the direct road, if Tippoo were to enter the Baramahl

Forts

For the slope of the north, cubic yards ... 3500

The wall between D. and P. being 200 yards in length, 20 feet in height, with a parapet of 6 feet, and a rampart of 6, would contain about 4032

The West face of the second line of defence being of the same description and 132 yards in length would contain nearly

The south face of the second line of defence being 130 yards in extent, 20 feet high, and 36 broad, rampart and parapet would measure 8340

The whole first line being of the same description and about 260 yards in extent, would probably contain, allowing for the brow of the rocks at some places ... 17640

And the total might be about ... 36232

cubic yards, which as I have supposed might cost an equal number of Pagodas.

44 I feel it necessary to observe here that while prompted by the desire of furthering the public service in this attempt, I have no practice in surveying or erecting fortifications, and consequently could not, previous, enter into the detail of what I have here given in the gross. That I must leave to professional men, no less from inability, than from the extreme urgency of my official avocations, which would render that necessary to which I could not consent. Actuated however by the ruling motive I profess, I shall proceed in my present enquiry. Having now considered every thing that appears to me necessary to be known relative to Pychota merely as a post, and found that,

in respect to situation, strength, and communication, it possesses many advantages, I may say more than any other hill fort on this side of India; it remains to add of what use it should be, in the event of a war with our neighbor to the eastward. That depends very on the general plan of defence, it is not my province to determine it, but to state, on that account, would annihilate any present designs.

We are also informed, it has been resolved to have all our magazines on the Carnatic, and there are doubtless strong reasons in support of that measure, but the vast difference between an offensive and defensive war, and the difficulty we should find in carrying on into the enemys country, without some depots upon the frontier, considered, it appears to me, that the securing two or three superior ones, in the ceded districts, would be of the first importance.

The being deeply impressed with that idea, and the supposition that doubts as to their security might be the principal objections to the advantages those so far have chiefly endeavoured the surveys I have made, are to ascertain means of security, to the satisfaction of government the strength, and capacity, of places, which in point of situation would answer the purpose. I should imagine that for every reason, one would be made of Rykota, and provided as roughly as may be in every concerning it. The spaces in the several fortifications, and the proceeds of a rent to them connected, I have no doubt of their answering, (all included) in the greatest extent as a magazine,

but

Forts

For the close of the north curtain yards 8500

The curtain between D, and F, being 200 yards in length, 20 feet in height, with a parapet of 6 feet, and a rampart of 6, would contain about 14532

The West face of the second line of defence being of the same description and 174 yards in length would contain nearly 27720

The south face of the second line of defence being 130 yards in extent, 20 feet high, and 36 broad, rampart and parapet, would measure 9860

The whole first line being of the same description and about 260 yards in extent, would probably contain, allowing for the brow of the rocks at some places 17640

And the total might be about 36232

cubic yards, which as I have supposed might cost an equal number of Pagodas.

44 I feel it necessary to observe here, that while prompted by the desire of furthering the public service in this attempt, I have no personal engagements or pending fortifications, and consequently could not, per se, enter into the detail of what I have here given in the gross. That, I must leave to professional men, as I differ from inability, those from the extreme urgency of my official avocations, which have rendered that research [illegible] Actuated however by the public motive I profess I shall proceed in my present enquiry. Having now considered every thing that appears to me necessary to be known relative to Rajkota merely as a post, and found that

on respect to situation, strength, and accommodations,
it possesses many advantages, (I may say more than
any other hill fort on this side of Canada) it remains
to add of what use it should be, in the event of a war
with our neighbors to the eastward. That depend-
ing on the general plan of defence, it would not
be necessary to determine the best to adopt, on that ac-
count, would unavailing pursuit. Besides
[illegible] I am informed, it has been resolved to
have all our magazines in the Province, and there are
doubtless strong reasons in support of that measure,
but the vast difference between an offensive and de-
fensive war, and the difficulty we should find, in
carrying it into the enemy's country, without some depot
upon the frontier, considered, it appears to me, that
the having such a one superior [illegible] in the ad-
vanced districts, would be of the first importance.
She being deeply impressed with that idea, and
the dispositions that doubts as to their security, was
the principal objections to the relinquishment of those for-
merly occupied by the troops, and the
means of procuring, to the satisfaction of government,
the strength, and convenience, of places, which on
account of situation, is said to answer the purpose.
I shall suggest that for every reason, a remark be
made of Rigaud, and of what necessity on our en-
tering concerning it. The papers with the
several fortifications, since the surrender of Quebec
have considered, I have no doubt of their answering,
It is stated in the [illegible] that extensive magazines,

Cur

guns on these works would be requisite. I have above
being somewhat better situated for their defence, and how
embrasures could be disposed with which could only
make them more accessible by escalade

40 The immediate object in constructing these
works must either be accommodation for troops, and
stores, or additional strength to the place. With
a regard to accommodation I have ascertained how
much further I have at present the rocks would
admit of these being carried out, and shewn it by
laying down on red lines upon the plan.
Allowing 10 feet more to the breadth of the rampart
casements might be constructed below of 16 or 12 feet in
breadth, and altogether probably 300 in length,
which might be converted into store rooms and gun
rooms. Other public buildings might be erected
on the rocks, or ascent of the hill, in rear of the said lines
That would have spaces amounting to 2400 square yards
in the short flat, & 4000 on the second (as severally
expressed on figures on the plan) for loading and unload-
ing &c, besides which the brow of the hill would answer
for the temporary stowage of gun carriages, carts, carriages
articles of timber, frequently left by an army on leaving
a garrison.

41 The present roads up to these flats being
indifferent, though practicable, for loaded bullocks and
two being necessary for the speedy receiving or delivering
of grain, or other stores, I have examined the west face
of the first line, with the view of making a ramp to
it, from the plan as represented on the plan No 7

at

at D, U and R, and by the Letters corresponding, in No 2.
It is entirely cut from the top to the bottom, the
slope to the East there makes an angle of 23 degrees and
that in the second one of elevation. I apprehend there-
fore, that the former would be rather too steep for cattle,
but if carried out by an addition of masonary, the slope
might be greatly diminished, and the direction being
straight, it would on that account be favorable for
draught. To avoid both the difficulty and expence
of that, a road might be brought from D, in the
road proposed to the upper fort, along the brow of
the mountain, into the second East. Being
level almost all the way from D, there can be no
doubt of its being perfectly practicable, and without
its requiring any other expence, than a few yards of
masonary, at one or two places.

42 In regard to the other object, which as
I suppose might induce the erecting these lower
fortifications, it appears, they could only add to the
strength of the place, according to the time it
might take the Enemy to get possession of them, and
to demolish the upper works unassailable, without them,
their reducing any additional security from them, must
be held inadmissible. As their stability may depend
on those general considerations, I shall subjoin a gross
estimate of their probable expenditure, similar to what has
been done of those above.

43 The wall between O, and D, being 41
yards in length, and 15 feet in height & 12 in thick-
ness, would contain, making some allowance

for

No 2

Forts

plain to the fourth flat, best as that might be done by the pioneers excepting a few yards of masonary, as some places that would be very trifling. Doubts being intertained as to the practicability of this undertaking, I have been at much pains to ascertain it and make it demonstrable to others. To do this, I must refer you again to the plan No 7 where the proposed tract is laid down, extending from the pethia gate A, for 890 yards, along the plain to the eastward B, where the ascent begins. From thence it winds for 1060 yards by C, D, and E, to the present gateway D, into the third flat, whence it may be carried on 378 yards more, to E, the entrance into the fourth flat, which is as far as necessary, making the whole distance from the plain 1438 yards, and more than one mile and a quarter from the pethia gate. To prove how practicable a road this may be made for carriages the whole tract has been surveyed, levelled, and laid down on No 8, which exhibits the whole slope in one profile, referring to the different angles in the windings by letters corresponding with those in the plan, where the whole being brought into one line, it proves to make an angle of only 7 degrees with the plane of the horizon. Being that be sufficient, it may be further adduced, that Colonel Lieut Douse who commands the pioneers, and has had great experience in cutting roads among hills, having seen the road pronounces that it may be made a good one for carriages. It would be difficult perhaps to make it sufficiently broad for a string of cattle to go up, while another is

coming round at the foot of the steepest of the mountain, and its rocky in many places, but in case of emergency, Sutlers loaded, could go up the new road and leave their loads, in a place, made for the purpose, outside of the present gate D, they might return empty, by the old one, as their loads could be carried into the third or fourth flat at leisure.

39th I shall likewise propose it were desired to fortify the two lower flats. Though the passage between O and D, being confined to the hill C, would require a stronger defence, the breadth of it would not admit of a wall thicker than 12 feet. It should therefore be very substantial work. The brow of the mountain there, being bluff, though not very high, 14 feet would be sufficient for the height of the wall to the line between D, and T, would be where what I have observed, be supposed to result, I think that a wall 20 feet high, with a parapet of 6, and a rampart of 6 more, constituting 3 more to cover of the works D, R, S, T, V, would be sufficient. A similar wall would be necessary on the west face, between W, and Z, and a tower might be erected on the large jetting rock to the left. The remainder of the second line between T and V, and the whole of the first line, being open to assault from the southward, and eastward, as fully shewn by reference to the plan No 2, and the ones 3, 4, 5, I think defences, 20 feet high, consisting of a parapet at least 12 thick, and a rampart underlining a banquette of 8 more, would be necessary. I propose the rampart so narrow, on the idea that guns

not, I think, require any other, for its security. The fourth line of defence might either be repaired or suffered to fall into ruin, as of little consequence when the others with works erected in front of it. These additions appear to me sufficient to render the rock, or upper fort of Rykota, an impregnable post, which I conceive may be a very important one independant of the lower fortifications.

37 As the distance from the plain is considerable, it would probably be as cheap to construct them, if approved, of stone, as of bricks, the former being at hand and all the bricks I have seen there, being very indifferent, it would certainly be better. I would likewise recommend that the outer lay or facing at least, be entirely in chunam. Having no experience whatever in building, I must confess myself unqualified to make a proper estimate of the expence of these works. A gross calculation may however be satisfactory. I have therefore sketched, and inserted the sections of them in No. 1 with reference to their respective places, where their ground plans are laid down in red lines, and ascertained how many cubic yards there may be in each, without deductions for gateways, embrasures &c. as I do not pretend to be particular. The following is the result of such an estimate.

The work, or entrance to the third line of defence being 20 yards in length and consisting of a parapet 20 feet high outside and 12 thick, also of a rampart 10 feet high and

and

Forts

and 18 broad would contain cubic yards 1360

The work on the rear of the above being 60 yards in length and in other respects of the same dimensions would contain 080-

The work L to the left of the great rock, called the fifth line of defence being 30 yards in length consisting of a parapet 40 feet high, and 12 feet thick, also of a rampart 8 feet broad allowing for the slope of the rock will probably be 1386

The work H J on the rear of that being 150 yards in length, and consisting of a parapet 20 feet high outside 18 feet thick and a rampart 18 feet broad allowing for slope would contain nearly 4533

The flat form on the summit might contain 500-

And the north face about the same 500

The defence from N to O on the east face being 260 yards in length and consisting of a parapet 20 feet high and 14 feet thick, also of a rampart 8 feet broad allowing for slope would contain 7442

The Total then it may be supposed would be about 19801

which would be the amount in pagodas were the whole to cost a pagoda per cubic yard This estimate may at best serve as one of the measurements and thence others may be made of the expence

38 And additional expence would be incurred in making a good cart road from the

laid down in red lines) at a small expence, for eventually destroying the work O should the enemy by any means get possession of it. It would be necessary to cover the work by a shoulder upon the right to prevent its being enfiladed from the hill 6, that being direct opposite. It would join the precipice to the left & be flanked by a small breast work that might

34 The other only accessible place to the southward is the defence L, which is only 30 yards in length and on each side of which, is an inaccessible precipice that might be breached from batteries upon the hills 4, and 14 (though the one be 1300, and the other 1000 yards from it) it would be proper to have it built of large stones, laid end wise, as little effect, might there be apprehended, from battering at such distances. I think the parapet and rampart including the banquette should be each 18 feet in breadth. To render this face perfectly secure, the wall J, and the bastion H which are 30 yards behind, may be rebuilt, and joined (as laid down in red lines) close to the precipice, forming the west face. Since that would be 1350 yards from the hill 4, to the southward, the only place where guns could be brought against it, I conceive that 4½ feet for the parapet, & 18 for the rampart and banquette, would be sufficient. This work I propose for guns, eventually, to dislodge an enemy in front. It would be flanked from the great work to the right, and be about 100 yards in length. The intermediate work IK, should be destroyed, also such of the works

as obstructing the sight, would prevent that on front of being entirely commanded from the works H, J.

35 The summit F commanding, as already shewn, in every direction, I think it should be enlarged and made a strong battery. It is at present a circular platform of 14 yards in diameter, and the rock will admit of its being extended 8 yards more each way, which would make it 30 in diameter. There would be room enough upon it then, I imagine for eight of the heavy guns on hand.

36 The defences of the north face, being out of the reach of common shot, and the mountain so difficult of access, it would be sufficient to repair them. Those round the northeast angle, as far as N, may be suffered to remain as they are, since they could be dispensed with, from the difficulty of access. The defences from N to O, a space of 260 yards, should be rebuilt, and of good masonary, for though every where upon the edge of a bluff rock that would be extremely difficult to ascend, they might even then possibly be exposed to a heavy fire from the hill 6, and some places to the northward of it. They should I think consist of a parapet 14 feet thick and 20 feet high outside, with a rampart of 8 feet on the surface enclosing a banquette. This line of defence, I propose should be only for carrying with musquetry, as any number of guns might be brought upon the high ground of the fourth flat for its defence. If that and the works before mentioned also were well executed, the east face and

through the jungle, on either side; but if the garrison where obstinate, he would have an arduous task to maintain his ground, or advance, for there is such opportunity behind the wall I, for entrenchments, which might be well flanked from the inaccessible height between F & G.

30 . . . If the gateway, or works defending the narrow passage to the right of the summit, and between D and O into the third flat, were briskly attacked from the hills to the eastward, the garrison could not continue there for account of splinters from the precipice above it defend it. Of course the enemy's every wish would depend on his efforts to force his way on, which the garrison might oppose with advantage by breast works within, where the passage widens, also by a flanking fire from the hill to the left.

31 . . . Were the defences of the third line between N & O knocked off, the enemy might likewise attempt it, by escalade, under cover of a smart fire from the hill to K & the side of the mountain below it: but that might likewise be powerfully opposed, because the garrison would never have occasion to expose themselves, unless to the foremost of the assailants, and would have every advantage of ground and cover.

32 Having now viewed Ryhela, in every direction, and weighing the advantages and disadvantages of its local situation, its heights and figure, with an eye to the attack and defence of it, I am of opinion, that few places are naturally so strong; but that it receives very little additional strength from its fortifications in their present state. Feeling confident in the

judgement

judgement I imagine to have acquired from this survey, I shall next deavise what appear to me necessary to make it one of the strongest places in the Company's possession. I shall first propose to fortify the great rock itself, which as we discovered at first, I observed rises out of the mountain, forming nearly all round a continued precipice, and composing the four upper flats.

33 One of the two accessible places to the south ward, is the entry to the third lane, by the passage D. O. P. O. which is only between 10 and 20 yards wide. Since the garrison could not stay in this passage, were it boldly attacked, and the defence of it adds nothing to the security of the palace, on account of the precipice to the left. I would destroy all the fortifications in front of O. and make that a strong work, mounting two pieces of cannon, which with another in the little bastion jetting out in the rear, would rake the passage so effectually, as make it impossible for an enemy to acquire the least footing in it. This work should have large rocks on the outside as a shoulder, which would almost cover it from the hill to the eastward, the only place where guns could be brought to bear upon it with any effect. I think the parapet should be 18 feet thick, and the rampart 18 more. The gate might be placed behind it, where a mine could not possibly reach it. Though the situation considered, that appears sufficient, another work, about 60 yards in length, with a good rampart and parapet 18 feet each in breadth, might be erected at the distance of 50 yards behind (as

this

Fort 5th

main to go, the steepness of the ascent, similar to ~~the hill on~~
26 ~~which~~ the four hills, 8, 9, 10 and 11, upon the south side
being able between 700, and 1000 yards from the summit,
consequently ~~nine~~ ~~double~~ the distance of those numbered 5 and
6, already described, also on the ~~main~~ circuline with their
~~two~~ superior advantages, ~~that would recommend them~~
~~in preference.~~ It may be worthy mention, ~~that there~~
are several deep cavities on the hill, which ~~contain~~
water in the driest seasons. The hill 11 is the only
other, on which batteries could be erected. There is more
room and such upon it, than any of the rest, excepting
that which is numbered 6, but it is between 800, and
900 yards from the first ~~now~~ ~~second~~ lines of defence,
about 1000 from the fifth, and the outer gateway of the
fourth, and it is commanded by the ~~mountain~~ that being
12 degrees above it. It is likewise between 3 and
5, below the lower lines of defence.

27 As all these hills are so partially and thinly
covered with earth, which might render it necessary to
carry it from the plain, our army might forego the
erecting his batteries upon the plain, as ~~I have~~ mention-
ed we did, under the disadvantage of being, by conse-
quence, much more commanded. The lower works
being open to the view, at the ~~first~~ 15, and only be-
tween 400, and 500 yards distant, are ~~to~~ ~~the~~ ~~offending~~
~~for an enemy~~
soon cover that we likely place to occupy, but the
summit is no more than 634 yards from it, and is 24
degrees above it. There are other spots at 16, and 17,
some respects, favorable, but the summit likewise
commands them greatly, being from 16 to 23 degrees
above

28 From the whole of this enquiry to ascertain the best position for attack, it appears that batteries erected near the plain, within good breaching distance, would suffer severely, from the superior height of the guns on the upper works, in proportion to their proximity, and that if the adjacent hills were occupied, to obviate that disadvantage, it would be attended with two objections, the not being in sight of the works first selected for breaching, and the scarcity of earth, which would be the most felt upon those hills, whose positions are, in other respects, the most eligible for posts. Some how or an enemy would labor under these disadvantages, according to the nature of the works, I can have no doubt that he would soon overcome them, were his attack made, while the works are in their present state, for there is no part of them which field pieces could not destroy in a few hours. If the lower defences were breached, they might be stormed, especially to the westward, or eastward, with a certainty of gaining possession of the upper part of the second flat at the foot of the precipices between D and Y, (vide the plan) which might be afterwards occupied in perfect security, which would facilitate, in some degree, the carrying of the fifth line L.

29 It has hitherto been supposed that it would be necessary for an enemy to possess himself of the lower works, before he could get so high as the upper ones, but the upper half of both the east and west faces of the second flat, being as before mentioned, without any defence at present, he might easily make his way [illegible] through

Ux

Forts

22 ... The south view is from the hill A, which is the only one of consequence on that side. The prospect it affords might enable an enemy to accomplish it, but the getting guns up would be an arduous task, as well from its steepness, as the number of large stones that cover it all round. It has two summits, one at the south end and one at the north end. The latter consisting only as represented on the foreground of the view of large heigh rocks, it would not answer for a battery, and its obstructing the sight, would make it necessary to retire from it towards the middle of the hill, where though the only place where a battery could be erected, is unfavorable, owing to the surface being mostly of stone. The most favorable spot is found to be 1033 yards from the nearest bastion of the first line 1160 from the second line of defence, and 1310 from the platform on the summit. Being upon a level the second line is very little above the first, and no more than 6 degrees below the platform. Hence it appears that the works in their present state, might soon be damaged from this hill, but that if well built of large hewn stone, or of good brick, the enemy might suffer greatly, before he could operate upon them with effect. The ascent is gradual, the two lower lines of defence would be difficult practicable, and the other three lines L, and D, would be still less favorable to the assailants.

23 . The hill 6, from which the south east view is taken, is in one respect better situated for breaching the east face of the first line of defence, or the outer gateway in the fourth line, being only 460 yards distant from the

former

former, and 484 from the latter; but the summit or platform being 35 ft, and the second line 3 degrees above it, it would be greatly commanded; besides the surface of the hill, being mostly stone, a battery of any magnitude would be slow in completing, from the want of earth; and an account of being fired into, what would be done on the ~~magazines~~ might be destroyed in the day. - Neither the second or the fifth lines can be seen from the hill, but guns upon it might be turned against the third line. 24 ~~[illegible]~~ The third and fourth lines of defence could be more annoyed from the hill b, as appears in the east view, the former being between 600 and 500 yards, and the latter between 500 and 600 from it - There is likewise more room and earth upon it, than any of the other hills; but it is effectually commanded, being 25 degrees below the summit, and 15 below the fourth flat where guns could be brought in any number against it.

25 - The hill f upon the north east, is the most favorable situation for destroying the defences of those lines being only 7 degrees below the summit and 1153 yards from it, whole it is only 5 degrees below the fourth flat, and 1000 from the level parts of it, where guns could be brought against this hill. - The nearest or north east angle of the third Line is 900 yards, and the farthest or southeast angle or outer gateway, is 1133 from it: and the whole is about this same level with it. But with this advantage of situation, and right, there is barely earth enough upon the whole surface, for a four gun battery, and I doubt it being possible to get field pieces upon it, for where it is at all practicable you come

flat: all of mud, one terraced, and baby, 15 feet by 9, two of them tiled, and out of repair, 24 by 15, and 19 by 9.

There is likewise a new terraced store room, 24 by 12, built of brick and mud, and provided with chevaux.

18 There are two old granaries within the fourth line, built of brick and mud, and terraced. They are both out of repair and infested with vermine. They contain about 57 garce of paddy. There are also two small round granaries built of mud and stone, in the pettah, which might contain about 29 garces, but they are extremely out of repair.

19 There are no accommodations whatever for troops upon the hill. In the pettah there are quarters for one Captain, two Subalterns, and three sergeants, besides houses built by the officers of the 4th battalion at their own expence. There are also barracks for four companies, an hospital, and a guard room.

20 Having taken the most accurate survey of the place, I shall proceed to make some observations, and then speak as to the construction or use of the fortifications. This will require the further survey against the plans of the enclosures, No 2, and the four views No 3, 4, 5 & 6, which should be all spread out on the floor, so as to be seen at once, for the necessary references. They should be reduced to half the size, as a commencement of circumstances admitted of it. Being slightly done, they must be considered only as military sketches. Care has been taken in reconnoitring every hill or rising ground in the place, and it contains all those, from which the views were taken, their respective numbers corresponding

The distances of each from different parts of the works, also their elevations above, or depressions below the works, are expressed on the red lines drawn from one to the other. The views are true portraits, every remarkable point in them being taken with a theodolite, and doing nothing being added, to make them more picturesque, than nature.

The figures observable at points in the outline, which are emitted horizontally, express degrees and minutes, the elevations above, and depressions below the horizon of the summits of the hills respectively, from which they were taken; and the other figures written across, express their bearings to the right or left of the contrasted points opposite to the observer.

The south view is from the hill 3, on the plan, which is the highest on that space. A better idea of many hill forts can be given by views than by plans, as appears in the present example. The undulating of the fifth line L, or breastwork of the first line B, are the only advantages which an enemy might have to the making the hill a fort. As appears by the figures on the red lines extending from them to the works, it is 795 yards distant from the second part of the first line of defence, 836 from the second line, 1063 from the summit or fifth, and 1130 from the fourth flat. It is between 4 and 5 degrees lower than the two first flats, and between 10 & 14 below the two upper ones. Hence though at a moderate distance from the works which might be battered from them, it is much commanded, that the fields attached by occupying this hill are counterbalanced by its unfavorable situation.

The

W

Forts.

along the east face O, P, Q, D, there are probably only three or four places, where men could possibly clamber up, so would the rubbish of the walls, if destroyed, make it still less more practicable. The whole extent of the north, and east faces are fortified with a wall of which, as shown by the views corresponding on the left side of the plan, the parapet is from 6 to 7 feet thick, the banquette from 2½ to 5 feet broad, and the height without side from 10½ to 20 feet. The wall of the fourth line of defence is of the same description, the brow of the hill, or rise to it, from the third flat, is irregularly, between 30 and 60 feet, and may be walked up, at any part, but there is hardly room for placing ladders, excepting at the gate ways. The cottage on the third flat is 133 yards in length, between 10 and 20 in breadth, and defended by four walls or ramparts with gateways in them, at O, P, Q, D, which were never more than musquet proof, and were falling down from decay, when the engineer began to rebuild the inner, and outer ones O, and D. The second flat is a natural defence to the eastward from the entrance into the third flat D, down to S, a space of 100 yards, being thought sufficiently secure, from the distance of the places, and thickness of the jungle. For the same reasons the walls of it, running over the tops of rocks, on the east face, from S to T, are only believed one, and three feet thick, and between 12 and 20 feet high. All the wall of it, from T, to V, viz the south, is of the same description, nearly. The whole of the west face is without any other defence than a small bastion, upon a jutting rock at W, and five or six feet of wall, about four feet high, at X, from

is

Forts

is very exposed between V, and W, that space, being a precipice, formed by a continued mass of immense rocks, but between W and Z, about 70 yards, though the brow of the hill be steep, and the jungle thick, it is very practicable, especially at X, and Y, where there are pathways, which join, and lead into the fortin, at G. The wall of the first face of defence, consists of a parapet, from 1½ to 5 feet thick, a banquette of 2 feet broad, and the height of it, out side, is unequally, from 7 to 20 feet, as appears by the sections on the left side of the plan, with references corresponding. Like all the other defences, it is built of stone and clay, which may be generally reckoned about a foot and a quarter thick, so that though it has been lately repaired, it would afford but a very indifferent cover against field pieces. The fortin is surrounded by a wall of the same description.

15 The only water on the hill being caught in reservoirs, which are out of repair, I apprehend from appearances they will be all dried up, before the return of the rains. The fortin is in part supplied by a few wells within it, but chiefly, from a number of tanks outside, some of which are near a mile distant. In dry seasons, all the watering stands have been thus stored with a scarcity of water, which I saw preventing, by repairing, and clearing out the tanks in the neighborhood.

16 There are three powder magazines in the hill fort, all of which are caves in the rock, with walls in front, one is near to the gate E, within the fourth line, a second is at the gateway F, and the third close to B, the outer gateway of the third line.

17 There are three old store rooms on the fourth flat

Forts

has arisen from the attempt, made for many years, to render differently qualified, for the security, for the defence of districts under my command, had induced me to construct upon such a survey, as I have described, of Rykota, by way of illustrating the advantages, which as I have conceived, may be derived from similar surveys of other places, I shall subjoin that kind of report, which I had mentioned as a necessary accompaniment of such surveys.

Rykota

13 This place is situated nearly on the level of the Mysore country, upon the verge of an extensive, woody, and mountainous tract lying between it and the other districts of the Baramahl, and at the head of a pass which it entirely commands, leading to Kungerry. It is about 192 miles west of Madras, 105 from Vellore, 118 from Arnee, 7 east of the western boundary, 55 from Bengloor, and 130 from Seringapatam. The plan No. 2, and the views No. 3 4 5 and 6 laid upon a table, for the plan together, will assist in forming a tolerable idea of it

14 It is a mountain, more than two and an half miles in circumference, out of which, the upper half rises abruptly and appears to be one entire rock, resembling in some points of view, (as in No. 7 partly) an animal crouching with its head to the southward. As shewing more particularly in the plan No. 7 (which cannot be so well as when spread on the floor) it consists of six different flats, five of which being fortified, I have denominated Lines of Defence. The gate way of the first B, is 690 yards from the foot, or the highest ground in the pettah at A, which is considerably above the level of the

neighbouring

neighbouring country. The distance to the second tower 180 yards, from that of the first. That of the third, D, is 240, that of the fourth E, is 390, and thence to the summit, or head of the ravine gained, F, is 325 more, which makes the whole road distance, 1775 yards. The whole perpendicular height is 236 yards, F is probably 260 above the common level of the Mysore country, and 300 above that of the Baramahl proper. From the summit F the descent is considerable to G, in the fourth band of defence, and from there, towards the fifth line, on the south face, it is level, as far as H, a small tower, where a descent leads by I, another small tower, to the most advanced of three parallel walls, J, K, L, built of stone, and mud, painted on the outside, and like the rest of the works, very old and decayed. The middle commands the one in front, and that on the rear the other two. But being only between 13 and 26 yards asunder, they are so near, that if destroyed, they would make one practicable breach, which could only be defended from the rear, as stones which might be thrown down the precipice to the right, would glance so much from the side, that probably few would fall on the line of defence 15 yards off on the breach, which would favor the assailants. From about the end of the wall L, round the whole of the west face to the south M, on the middle of the north face, is a continued precipice, in most parts getting over the brow of the mountain, as may be seen in the view, No 3, and that place, opposite the town, would be so difficult of ascent, that any opposition would make it impracticable. From there, eastward round to the Cattle bastion, N, it is quite inaccessible, and thence

along

hence whatever has been done in respect to the preserving enlarging or repairing of some, and the destroying of others.

10 I doubt however, though the appointing surveyors, engineers, and inspectors to survey all the Forts, as the likeliest means of procuring full information on them, that it has yet been collected. The Gentlemen who were sent for the purpose, executed, and with accuracy, whatever they conceived adequate to the ends proposed, and what may be commonly allowed to be so, because straight lines and dimensions only are requisite in plans of regular fortifications, and few are in the habit of representing irregular bodies, such as the great masses of stratified rocks, or mountains which constitute the principal parts in this country. I imagine this from the many plans I have seen, which gave but a very imperfect idea of them, and hence I conclude, that though their respective situations, are sufficiently known from geographical surveys & report, and general notions have been acquired of the capacity and strength of every place, the plans are still wanting, by which a competent judge might form of the ideas on which they may be severally conducted, or of the propriety there may be in the proposed additions, alterations, or repairs.

11 In my opinion what may be stiled a military survey, should be made of every post, comprehending a mile or two of its environs, to convey a thorough idea of its local situation; a minute representation of the quality of ground within the walls or near them, to shew the room for accommodation under, and the difficulty

on case of access, at different parts from without, — sections, not only of the walls, but of the whole faces, whereon some of them, as very essential in shewing the strength or weakness of hill Forts in particular bearings, from every spot where batteries could be erected to the greatest advantage, with their point-blank to the different works, with the distance, and elevations, from the one to the other, — and a full report, containing descriptions of every part of the fortifications, and buildings, also of the ground inside, or out, with an eye to the attack, or defence of the place; and pointing out, every thing that occurs, for its use or security.

such surveys, if executed with ability, and zeal for the service, would convey so complete a knowledge of every post, that they might be always referred to, as infallible guides, in every military arrangement respecting them. From the want of such surveys, government, and the heads of departments, are under the necessity of risking their opinions, solely, upon the general ideas they have conceived of places, and the representations of the individuals, who are to carry what is proposed into execution, whose judgement may happen to be naturally defective, or biased by self considerations, owing to which, works being constructed of improper materials, may prove of no real advantage when erected, or being totally unnecessary, they may contribute to the weakness, rather than the strength of a place, and involve an unnecessary expence

12 Though my avocations, being more than ordinary, not a little inconvenience and difficulty has

General View

proceeding to the carrying his ravages into the Carnatic, it would likewise be practicable for him to occupy all of them, excepting a few miles round every port in our possession. Were he to make them his primary object in the war, and if encouraged by the absence of our army, to allow the conquest of them, there are only three places that I think he would not be able to reduce.

Whether devastation, or the hope of conquest, should induce the invasion of the ceded districts an inference may hereafter be drawn from an inspection of the monthly proportions in which the crops are usually reaped in them. I shall therefore insert the following result of my inquiries on that head. The whole annual land produce reckoned equal to 100, and the numbers opposite to the months, express their average produce, respectively, in percentage of the whole

January	18	July	2.
February	15	August	0.
March	3	September	0.
April	5	O.N.D.	0
May	4	November	32
June	3	December	18

This being an estimate for the average of years, it requires allowance to be made for the late or early seasons, which some times, like the present year, make the difference of a month or two. It appears from the above, that generally, these districts would suffer the least from an invasion, on June or July, when the last of what are called the long cloth crops of paddy are gathered in, and that they would suffer the most by one on October, or November, when the first of the dry, also of the Cotton

crops

crops of paddy, are ready for cutting.

7 As to forage and water, the ceded districts do not
flourish either in abundance, but Tingrioter, and Sungas-
pate, on account of their Portality, and the junction of
several small rivers with the Poonaur, which divides them
appear the most favorable for both, and being the least
remote from our garrisons, they and the adjoining dis-
tricts of the Carnatic, would on all accounts, be the best resort
for a body of the enemys cavalry, intended for limited ex
cursions, or for escorting convoys through these districts, into
the Carnatic.

8 The relation which measures proposed for the
security of these Districts should have, with what appears prac
ticable to an enemy, has induced the foregoing view of it.
The adopting such as may thence be conceived necessary, or
may prove to interfere with the general plan intended
but unadvised of it, mine cannot be more, than a partial
arrangement. Descending now, to the particular heads
of it, I shall first consider the Incantonation of the different
Corps in these districts.

Jon

9 In the case of there having been no forts nor
Towns, either ceded, and government Building such as might
be necessary, the particular purposes or views for them, would
of course have determined their respective situations, recited
and strength: but having found a number constructed to
our hands, economy has required, that by investing that
operation or principle, the purposes which they are, or may
be considered capable of answering, has been determined by
the knowledge acquired of their local circumstances, and

hence

General Views

over the entrance of the southward of that place. As the effect of our having acquired such extensive possessions on the west coast, will certainly be the dividing his force, and the Sepoy has prospect of advantage from a rupture with the English, it is the more difficult to conjecture, what his primary object may hereafter prove, in such an event, but to induce the subject proposed for consideration, it is enough to suppose, that the state of affairs, at some future period, will turn his views to the Ceded Districts, or the Carnatic to the northward of the Cavery, and to provide for what will most probably follow.

3 In this enquiry, advantage will be found from casting the eye over the accompanying map N° 1, in which the ceded districts are distinguished by different colours. As may therein be observed the country is in general mountainous, between the Bhaw-any and Coimbatore and it is thence imagined, that we have a strong frontier, but it may be more properly said, that we have a degree, which mountains serve as a security, but our frontier is the stronger, on that account, for they are formidable equally without his territory, and where they are not, as in Coimbatore, it is easier for him to occupy them, than for us to repel him. Besides the narrow passes or defiles in them frequented as roads for merchants or travellers are so numerous, that the districts are almost every where open to the predatory excursions of horse, and armies with guns may enter them in so many quarters, that admitting a few exceptions, the like may be used in speaking of more formidable enemies.

4 The Salem District would however derive some security in July, August, September and October from the

the Cavery, being generally full in those months, and the eastern half of them, from their being so much interspersed with hills. The forts in them are likewise at such proper distances as to afford them equally, that protection which it may be expected they could receive from them, against small parties of the enemy. The northern districts of the Baramahl would also be partly free from predatory excursions, on account of their being so encompassed or interspersed with hills, and their approximation of our forts from the garrisons on that quarter. But most of the center districts, comprising a tract of at least 60 miles square, being less intersected by hills, or protected by forts, would, in the absence of our army, be overrun, and during an unsuccessful campaign or two, might be so far settled under the enemys government, as to yield them supplies. For the efforts of garrisons that are deemed only sufficient for the defence of their posts, are necessarily so confined, as would not much interrupt his collections.

From the same circumstances, his convoys might follow him through the center district into the Carnatic, as detachments could escort those which might enter by Horry-drug through the Ryeota and Palcode districts, and those which might enter from Caveypoorum through the Penagra district, to Darampoory, a mud fort that might serve for their common rendevous; which would be sufficient to ensure their safely into the heart of the Carnatic, as experienced in the war of 1780. I have only mentioned the facility with which an enemy might enter, and traverse or occupy the center districts, in particular, as the necessity

proves our

I was called upon on December to co-
municate my sentiments to the Right Honble the Gover
upon what might be necessary for the better security o
the posts on the western Frontier. I suggested that, for
reasons assigned, in my letter to his Lordship of the 16
January, it was not in my power to give such full
information as I wished upon the several subjects
which a communication of that kind ought to compre
hend. What I have yet to offer upon them in th
report must, for the same reasons, be defective, but I only
propose by it, as an outline or specimen, of what I conceive
necessary, as a further compliance with his Lordships
commands. Though much method might rather be
observed in one containing, matter professedly better dig
sted, than any I can give, I shall decide that which
shall appear proper to include here, under different heads,
departments, and refer to the accompanying draughts, m
forms or statements as may be requisite for explanations

General View

The nature and position of our whole western
Frontier considered, it is equally probable, that when a war
may break out with one or more of the native powers, the
Miamis, or the Wabash Tribes invade the Carnatic
the Northward of Santee, and that Cherokees
from

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Captain Kuaas

Military Report

has been entered on this account standing on the Books under the Head of Public and Private Credetors of the Nabob at Pagodas 1,039,527..32 67 In the Orders of the 4th of August 1788 the Court of Directors say "We propose that, in lieu of the Annual payments to us "for the Debt incurred on account of the War, he the Nabob "should make over to us the Peshcush payable from "Canjore together with the Arrears due upon it" The Annual Payments here mentioned are the Company's Proportion of the 12 Lacks, and, the Nabob having accepted the proposition tendered to him, the Board apprehend that the amount remitted to the time of such acceptance, should be carried to the Credit of the second War with Hyder Ally.

It may be proper, before the Board conclude, to observe, that the Account to which the Nabob's present Remarks and Objections are confined, is, what is usually called his old or separate Account, as it stood at the close of the second War with Hyder Ally. His Highness has not touched at all upon the Kistbundy Account arising out of the Treaty made with Sir Archibald Campbell, in 1787; but, in a Letter to the Governor dated the 20th July 1791, he transmits some observations upon that account, which were replied to on the Minutes of Council the 6th September that year.

END OF VOLUME

1/9/9

will perhaps be more than the real Loss amounts to, and the Board are inclined for the reasons stated in the Answers of the Deputies to think it is; but if the Company be disposed to shew favor at all in this case, the mode proposed appears the least liable to objection of any that can now be adopted –

The Board having gone through the several Remarks of the Nabob, and the Answers thereto on the part of the Company, proceed to give their opinion upon the adjustment recommended in Consequence of the Nabobs acceptance of the proposition tendered to him by the Company's Orders of the 20th August 1788

The Assignment made by the Nabob of his Revenue in 1781 was declared on his part, and understood, on the part of the Company, to be meant exclusively for the support and Expences of the War, and the Board see no cause to doubt that the act is still so interpreted by the Nabob, and so understood by the Company. –

The net Receipts from that Assignment were carried to the Credit of the Nabobs account because it was originally

originally intended to debar them for their full proportion
of the War Expences whenever it could be precisely ascertained; but the Company having agreed, on certain terms, to forego that Intention and to rest satisfied with what had been already appropriated by the Nabob to the Service of the War, it follows, of Course, that the Revenue expressly Assigned for that Service must be written off from the Highness's Credit, to the Credit of the Second War with Hyder Ally.—

To this effect is the opinion of the Deputation supported by a variety of Arguments which the Board approve. They also concur with their Gentlemen in thinking it most conformable to the Company's Meaning that all the Charges, carried to the Nabob's Debit which can be supposed to have any relation to the War, should be struck out of this separate Account. The mode proposed by them for ascertaining the Amount of such Charges, appears, under the Circumstances they have stated, the least exceptionable of any that could be adopted.

There is one Article still on record relative to the present subject, to which it seems necessary to advert. By the Treaty of 1786 the Nabob agreed to pay 12 Lacs of Pagodas per Annum in liquidation of his Public and Private Debts. The Company share of

to withhold them at a time especially appointed
for the Reception of his claims. He declares
himself ready to prove the Sums expended to have
been made, yet keeps back the Vouchers when
that proofs solicited - All that the Board can
reply upon these, and other General declarations
of the same kind is, that they are sincerely
desirous to satisfy the Nabob in every just de-
mand, but their duty obliges them to reject all
demands that are not vouched particularly
and are entirely vague and unsupported -

X His Highness, under this Item, has
taken Credit for what he calls an overcharge in
the Rent of the Jaghire He held these Lands in
farm from the Company until after the com-
mencement of the War, at which time they
were completely overrun and laid waste by
the Enemy, and Government, for the mutual
advantage of the Nabob and the Company, took
them into their own Hands - which he kept them
he was undoubtedly responsible for the Rent, as
are these all that has been carried to his Debit
The last Rent fell due the 1st September 1780. -

If instead of taking Credit for any part of the Sum carried to his Account as an Overcharge; the Nabob had preferred his claim to a Remission of Rent in consideration of the Calamity which had fallen upon the Jaghire the Pleas would have been regular; but as it rested with him to make and prove the claim, and not with Government to satisfy the Loss by any premature deduction upon the Imputation of an overcharge seems to be particularly unmerited –

That the Jaghire suffered extremely by the Depredations of Hyder's Horse in July, August and September 1780, is an indisputable Fact, but the actual Loss sustained by the Nabob on that account was never regularly stated or proved in any way whatever –

The Board in Consultation the 6th September 1791, gave it as their opinion that if the Company were inclined, as Matter of Indulgence, to allow any deduction from the rents of the Jaghire the best mode perhaps would be to vouch back to the Nabob's Credit the Amount of the Rents that fell in after the Enemy's Horse entered the District – This might

the Amount of the Current Charges and declared that he would not be answerable for more than a certain Sum, is clear enough, and that Government as frequently declared their anxious wish to reduce those Charges, and to avail themselves of any suggestion he could offer for so desirable a purpose, is equally manifest. The Correspondence on this occasion includes Letters that before related to the three disputed Battalions, and proves the miserable State of dependance into which the Company were thrown by the want of some systematic Arrangement for regulating their Connection with the Nabob, and for providing a sure mode of reimbursing their advances upon his account. This defect was a perpetual Source of embarrassment, and they were frequently compelled by their own distresses to submit to the most mortifying Concessions — But, amidst all the Inconveniences and disappointments to which they were exposed, they never yielded their right to be paid what they actually disbursed for Current Charges, and if the Character in which they acted as Defendors of the Carnatic — if formal Engagements to make good

the

the amount of their pecuniary Advances for the Service of the Quantum of the Current Charges compared with the extent of the fore kept up, and the number of Garrisons maintained, or even the Sums now required for similar purposes, be duly and impartially considered, no doubt can remain of the just claim of the Company to be reimbursed in every Pagoda that has been allotted to the Nabob under this Head.

VW The Board are concerned to observe further claims, to a very large amount, for Grain said to have been delivered by the Company Servants at different places, but without producing any authorities whatever, or even mentioning dates or other Circumstances necessary to ascertain the Charge. It is extraordinary, however that this, in some former remark(F) the Nabob himself made of the Conduct of the Company's Servants in refusing to give Receipts for Articles supplied from their Stores, should not occur to him on this occasion, to call upon them for the Vouchers (92 as actually in his possession of the Such Vouchers as they should be required to have only

O. V. existing Engagement relative to the defence of the Carnatic, and that the circumstances attending it were such as ought in reason to have called from the Nabob an acknowledgment of the sincere and disinterested friendship he experienced on that occasion

The remaining Item under this reference (Pages as 30409. 23.. 38) is not supported by much explanation or Remark of any Kind from the Nabob — In the answer some attempt is made to account for it, but whether the conjecture be right or wrong the Board will not presume determine — His Highness can have no claim for this, or any other, credit unless some authority be produced — In this Instance he is altogether Silent, and the Item itself is too general to afford the smallest clue to Information —

T The Nabobs remarks under the Head of Current Charges are so fully answered by the Deputies, that further observation may perhaps be superfluous, Yet the Board deem it incumbent upon them to say a few words upon a subject which has at various times been much agitated, and with very opposite Sentiments —

By current charges are meant the ordinary

ordenary disbursements formerly made on account
of the Nabob in time of Peace, for the Pay of his
proportion of the Seapoy Establishment and the
charges of his Garrisons – Before any Specific
Treaty was concluded for regulating the Aids to
be furnished by Hes Highness towards the gener
defence, the advances made by the Company on
his behalf were subject to some variation. The
Number of Seapoys to be kept up for the Carnat
had indeed been stated at 10 Battalions of
Men each, but the Garrison Charges of every Sort
the expences of Batta, of Ammunitionments &c
not been, and, from their nature could not be, fix
at any precise amount – The Nabob says he never
agreed to pay an Amount of the Current Charges of more
than Pagodas 36,000 per Annum, but it does not
appear that any Agreement at all upon this point ha
ever entered into, and, however much the Company
Servants might have wished to reduce the expence
it was impossible for them to undertake that they
would not exceed 36,000 Pagodas per Annum, more
than given Sum –

That the Nabob frequently objects

where the point of reason lies But the want of vouchers, and the natural disposition of Parties, at such a time, to take every advantage in accounting for their Rents, make it impossible to decide with any regard to Propriety, otherwise than by adopting the common principle of reputing what cannot be supported by Proof. It appears that when the present claim was first brought forward, the Government appointed a Committee to examine it, and such part as could be sustained was admitted — The Board observe that the Company's Deputies have closed their Remarks upon this Item by a reflection which seems to have been dictated with some warmth, and which their Judgment, on a further Consideration, would probably have omitted —

N & O to the Credits taken under these references are connected with the Subject of the War Expences, and included in the Item **C** whereon necessary to remark upon them in this plan. —

P & Q The same observation as the foregoing

R & S The Items under this reference No 1.2.3 & 5

are

one of the class comprised in the Remark N & O. N 4 is

Credit taken by the Nabob for Pagodas 2,19,313.. 6. 14

which he thinks improperly charged to his seperate

account- this sum was advanced for the disbursement

of a large Arrear of Pay and Juding Money due to the

Cavalry in his own Service at the Commencement of the

war of 1780- The state to which the several Regiments

were reduced had, very naturally, in a crisis so dangerous,

given serious cause of alarm, and the Nabob earnestly

solicited a Loan from Government to enable him to

settle their accounts- faithfully promising to repay

the Money when tranquility should be restored

The Government, tho' its own necessities at that

period were particularly urgent, and tho' it was

impossible to raise so large Sum otherwise than

by borrowing it at Interest, consented to make

the advance required; and, with much trouble

and embarrassment, at length accomplished the

Nabob's wishes- On perusing the Correspondence nothing

can be more clear than that the transaction was

considered by both parties purely as a loan to

ease Highness from the difficulties that pressed upon

him- that it had no concern whatever with a..

Government requiring these Stores to be delivered to Sir Edward Hughes, nor is it probable that more ever removed by the Company than they have given Credit for; but a Letter has been written to the Military Board desiring particular of Report of the Quantity deposited in the Arsenal, and if it should be found to exceed what has been Carried to account, further Credit will of Course be given —

K It is not comprised for what account the Canvas Mentioned in this Item was supplied but, as it appears by the Notes that passed between the Nabob and Lord Macartney to have been delivered upon the order of the former the Board are of opinion that the Nabob should have credit for the Amount —

L The Consent of the Nabob to relinquish the two Districts of Vellencour and Bahour, which were ceded to the French by the last treaty of Paris could not have been a very free one — It was however a necessary sacrifice to the Honor of National

National Engagements; and, considering all the
Circumstances of the case, there was Merit even in
a reluctant accommodation; but, as the Nabob
yielded what was required of him without stipulating,
or probably computing any equivalent, the Board are
at a loss to account for the present determination
to demand Credit for the Annual Value of the
Lands, from the Period they were relinquished
upon this Subject the Board wish to avoid offering
any particular remark, because they are unwilling
to call in question the Original Merit of the Nabobs
Compliance —

M The same observations will apply here that
were made upon the Item **F**. No credit can properly
be allowed for any Articles said to have been supplied
during the war, unless vouchers of some Kind are
produced — The Nabob urges the distracted Situation
of the Country at that time, as the cause of his not
having been able to procure regular accounts from
his Servants — That such distraction prevailed is
certainly true, and the Board would feel great
pleasure in admitting every reasonable Claim to
consideration on this Account, if they could see any

In Rem The Nabob answer'd says that Receipts were given for different supplies to the amount of — Pagodas 78,698. 1. 35 for which of course, he ought to be credited —

C The Claim made by the Nabob under this Article is for the value of Troop Horses with the Accoutrements &c. transferred from the Regular Service to that of the Company — The Answer given by the Defendants to this Claim is very full, and the Board agree generally in their Remarks, at the same time they think if the Nabob can shew, by any Returns, or other vouchers, the Number of Horses &c. delivered, that he should be allowed credit for the amount at a reasonable Valuation — This Transaction took place at the Beginning of the War of 1780, when Hyder was actually laying waste the Country, and the public Confusion was very great on all sides — Has the Nabob, at that juncture the right of making any Claim, the number and Value of the Horses &c. might have been ascertained with some degree of accuracy — But the time which has elapsed makes it now utterly impossible — If the Governor General be of

opinion

opinion, under all the Circumstances taked, that any allowance should be made upon this account, the Board are inclined to think that half the Amount for which the Nabob has taken credit would be very ample.

H The Board are of opinion that the claim of Credit under this Head is all founded, but the Sum charged to the Nabob on account of the difference between the real price of Grain issued to Seapoys, and the rate at which it was charged to them, being a Loss on Account of the War, and being already included in the Credit taken by the Nabob under the Item C - no further remarks is required in this place

I The Negotiation carried on between the Nabob and the Danish Government for the purchase of Military Stores, without the Knowledge or Sanction of the Company's Representatives was certainly, upon every account, improper, yet as the Government at that period so far countenanced the proceedings in any Stage of it, as to receive a part of the Stores into the Company's Arsenal for such part the Nabob has undoubtedly a right to Credit - The Board can have no Objection to

C. The Credit taken by the Nabob under this Reference for Pagodas 706,351 – 60 is on Account of an Extra Charge in the Superintendants Books, as explained in the Answer made by the Company's Deputies to this Article – It is necessary here to observe, that this, and several other Items in the Credit taken by the Nabob, have reference to the Charges of the Second War with Hyder Ally which will be treated hereafter, and are to be determined on the Principles of the Proposition offered on the part of the Company to His Highness and formally accepted by him. That Proposition however is not once mentioned in the Nabob's present remarks, and it appears evident indeed from his Letter to the Governor dated the last, that he considers himself free from the obligation incurred by this acceptance of it. such Conduct it is impossible to reconcile to any Idea, either of consistency or prudence –

D The objection under this reference is removed by the explanation given in the Answer to the Nabob's remarks –

E The Fact being as stated in the answer to the Circars remarks, the Board are of opinion that the mode proposed for adjusting this Item is very proper

F The Credit taken by the Nabob under this Item seems to want every kind of proof that is necessary to support a claim of this Nature - For the Articles of Stores said to be delivered at various times Amounting to Pagodas 10,7295 " 18 " 25 no Voucher is produced, nor is there any specification of Date, Name, or Place - The Board have no reason to suppose that the Company's Servants, or the different Garrisons or with the Army, would decline Granting Receipts for what was actually delivered - That the Nabob did in some Instances, complain of the difficulty of obtaining Receipts for Grain Supplied from his Stores is true, but that difficulty did not in any Instance appear to have arisen from a disinclination to acknowledge what was actually received, but from differences between the Company's Agents and the Nabobs Servants with regard to the Measurement and price in which the former thought undue advantages were attempted to be

[illegible]

of which Number there was judged reasonable by Govern-
ment, that the Nabob should pay 10000 - To this
proposition His Highness objected in the most re-
pointed terms, and as his Sentiments at this
period were become very unfavorable to the Company
Administration, no efforts of Argument or persua-
sion ... the smallest Impression upon his mind

The Court of Directors approved the
Resolution of allotting 10,000 Sepoys for the Nabob
professions, as absolutely necessary to the Service requi-
red and fully sanctioned by the Nabobs former requests
- They directed their opinion to be communicated
to His Highness, and if he should still withhold
his Consent, that this Number should nevertheless be
charged to his account -

The Board consume that when the
Company had, at the Nabobs Instance, assumed the
Charge of defending the Country, and by the same
authority had determined the quota of Sepoys necessary
for this purpose, no subsequent change in his Highness
Sentiments, from whatever cause, could be admitted
as a reason for weaking that Force, or for discon-
tinuing to charge the expence of it to his Debt -

Mr

All the arguments therefore, drawn by the Nabob from his consenting at one time to admit the charge, as Matter of favor, and at another to allow it in consideration of his being sputten possession of the Tanjore Country, have no weight whatever — They only prove that he availed himself of the Embarrasments which the Governor and Council had brought upon themselves by disbursing the pay of the full Establishment ordered to be kept up, and that the fear of losing the Money, so fairly expended on his account, induced them to remove or render any denomination, or with any condition the Nabob chose to annex to the Payment —

With regard to the ability of the Carnatic, at any period, to make good the Expence of 10 Battalions of Sepoys, the Board, judging from their own experience, and from the Nabob's present engagements, cannot admit the smallest Force to any pretentions founded upon this plea, and as no private Incumbrances could reasonably be allowed to stand in the way of that first and most essential object, the preservation of the Country, there is not even a shadow of excuse for refusing to abide by so just a charge

The

defining the nature and extent of the Engagements between them — In tracing the History of this connection it appears that every obligation political or pecuniary was accomplished by the Intercourse of Letters — These do not always afford so sure a criterion for the Judgment as the formal & stipulations of a public Agreement — Never the less it cannot be denied that the Records exhibit certain principles by which the Nabobs account may be traced with a considerable degree of accuracy, and upon these principles the Board now proceed to examine the disputed Articles —

A & B With regard to the first two Items, or overcharges, as they are called, for the Seapoy Establishment kept up for the defence of the Carnatic, the Board, having deliberately weighed the Objections urged by the Nabob, and the Arguments brought forward on the part of the Company, are of opinion that the pay of the three disputed Battalions has been justly and fairly carried to the Nabobs Debit In deciding this point the Board apprehend it is sufficient to observe, that by the early and effectual support given by the Company to the Nabob they fixt him in the Government

[illegible] utterly incapable of maintaining himself in his new dominion, he pressed them to take the defence of the Country upon themselves, and, so early as the year 1765, when the Seapoy Establishment had been augmented to 10,000 Men, he particularly requested that no diminution might take place in the Number. That this Force, instead of being exorbitant, appears indeed to have been disproportioned to the nature and extent of the Territory to be defended, for, by the joint opinion of Generals Laurence and Caillaud, it was found that, out of the whole number, two Battalions could not be assembled, without leaving some part of the provinces defenceless.

The Nabob, it is true, some years afterwards (1769) declared his inability to support the charge of 10,000 Sepoys, and the Government, yielding to the plea of poverty, reduced them to 7000, but the Court of Direction, after consulting the opinion of experienced officers at home, determined that the Native [illegible] Establishment for their own and the Nabobs possessions in the Carnatic, should be 12,000 Men,

of

Information which their Instructions taught them to expect, and were liable to still further embarassment by the Nabob's declining to authenticate the Remarks he had delivered, and by thus expressly reserving to himself the privilege of making further objections hereafter should the circumstances of the examination render such a step advisable

The Board might, perhaps, have been warranted in declining to proceed in an Enquiry that had so far deviated from the Letter and Spirit of the mutual agreement under which it was instituted; but, anxious to receive the Objections of the Nabob in any mode in which he chose to convey them, they ordered their deputies to take the Remarks into consideration and to report their opinion upon them with as little delay as possible —

When the Board consider the difference between the demand stated by the Company to be due to them from the Nabob, and the demand brought forward by the Nabob against the Company, they are not surprised that the deputies should have been so much perplexed by the want of explanation, that they should have felt the necessity of having

immediate

immediate recourse to the Records of the Company for the purpose of tracing, from its Commencement, their Connection with the Nabob, and the nature of those Engagements on which their respective Claims are founded.

In this research, which appears to have been undertaken by one of the Deputies of (Mr. Place) there are evident Marks of laborious & diligent and attention to the Subject of Investigation every thing material relative to the Account between the Nabob and the Company is brought forward and applied with great ability to the elucidation of the contested Articles, and the Board are of Opinion, that, on whatever mode Articles may be finally determined, the Materials now selected from the Records will supply Information highly useful and necessary to the Decision. —

Considering the Importance of the Interests which have connected the Company and the Nabob for upwards of 40 years, it is remarkable that there should not, until very lately, have existed any written treaty or other Instrument

defining

their transactions, as already suggested in the beginning of the Work. But time would not admit of any discussion being compiled at The first and second Divisions of it may however be useful, particularly in deciding upon the 3 Battalions or 3000 Lyons to which the Nabob has objected and the seven Charges; for these, unconnected, have a reference to the earliest concerns of the Parties

For the same reason that I have not finished the 3d Part I have also been prevented from making my references to such parts of the records as I have Consulted.

/signed/ Lio: Place

Opinions and Remarks of the Board on the Report of Messrs. Wood and Place dated the 1 July 1793.

The Board having carefully perused the Letter and Report of the gentlemen appointed to investigate the account between the Company and the Nabob, and maturely weighed the objections brought forward by His Highness against that account, as well as the grounds on which they supported, now proceed to state their own opinions and remarks upon the whole subject before them.

It were to be wished that, on this discussion, the Nabob had thought it proper to conform to the mode prescribed, by permitting his Deputies to meet those on the part of the Company, for the purpose of mutual explanation upon the several contested Articles. But His Highness, tho' repeatedly and earnestly invited to adhere to the principle of examination suggested by the Governor General, chose to discuss the subject in his own name rather than by personal delegation, and in writing rather than by personal conference. Thus the Deputies on the part of the Company are precluded from that free, open, and ready

explanation

all of them will attend to this Case I combebuted to accordate.—

As a necessary consequence, when of the work on which the Company had engaged, they continued their support to enable him to gather the fruits of the title which they had procured for him. The Governor suggested her resort to direct the Imperial Seal of Government to an advantageous step towards his recognition among his Subjects; but he wished, while the Army continued assembled to the Southward, to embrace the opportunity of compelling the Tributaries to liquidate the long arrears into which they had fallen to the Peishwa, which was agreed in. Of these, the most formidable for their Strength, and Important for their Tribute, were the Timmerilly Polygars, who had been uninterrupted by any of the Incursions from which other parts of the Country had suffered. Consequently became the first object. Government, of Course, took the precaution of reserving themselves a proportion of what might be recovered from them, after defraying the expences of the expedition — but were disappointed either in relation by Circumstances which are not con

-nected

connected with the present discussion, and therefore do not requiner to be mentioned

The Detachment was recalled, and, on its return to Trichinopoly, Government took the opportunity of again recommending the Nabob to come to Arcot where "his presence, although but for a short time, might be attended with advantages; all the Country would be more convinced of his Right, and, by a nearer Correspondence, or perhaps personal Confidence with them, some further means might be suggested for the payment of the Companys Debt."

It was my intention to have proceeded with the third part of this plan and then to have taken up the answers to the Nabobs remarks, nearly perhaps, in the manner I have now used.— From which I conceive an advantage would have resulted by the comprehensive view which would have been presented, of the connection between the Company and the Nabob, in the whole of their

the future tranquility was to be built — The French, by the full acknowledgement of Mahomed Ally to the Government of the Carnatic, having relinquished the long contested point, all other obstacles were easily overcome — and a provisional Treaty was soon settled. The Mahrattas had, some time before, been prevailed upon to retire out of the Country for the consideration of Three Lacks of Rupees from the Rajah of Tanjore, and some Grants from the Nabob.—

Notwithstanding the Mysoreans were deserted by their Allies, they still remained at Tschundapoly; their attempts to gain possession of the place were too feeble to succeed, and their force and Military Skill, being too contemptible to deserve the serious attention of the Army, in a collected state, it was divided, and employed in more beneficial purposes — The Dellaway, finding all his designs frustrated, at last retired to his own Country. — For the first time the Nabob had now a prospect of prospering: his Government, but, although he was completely freed from every foreign Enemy, much remained to be done before he could be peaceably seated in it; all established authority had been so long sus-

pended

suspended that any Polygar or Chief who could afford
able a few followers had assumed an Independence of
his own; and this, at all times, but too prevalent
disposition among them, had been so long indulged
in the free exercise of Power, as to require the most
vigorous exertion in recovering a proper tone of
obedience to the Sovereign of the Country. — Besides
the Gratification which arose from a total Freedom
from restraint, they had, by the Collection of many
Years Revenues, rendered themselves able to maintain
a very formidable Force, to oppose any compulsa-
tory means that might be used to reduce them to
Subjection: The Company therefore would only have
half finished their task, had they upon this occasion
withdrawn their assistance; for to give the Nabob
a Name without the means of Supporting it,
was but leaving the Door open for new Competition,
which would have brought on inevitable destruction
to both parties. — On the late fortunate event the
Nabobs Situation which had been reduced to the
lowest point of distress, did not immediately mend
— His followers were few, and Mutinous for pay,
and he had not always the means of supplying
his Domestic wants, which his relations, now

all

from the Nabob an acknowledgement, attested by the Cauzy, that the Circar was responsible to the Company for whatever Sums had been, or might be incurred; in the defence of it. — Justice therefore — would have strictly warranted, when driven to the last extremity, their resorting to the most effectual means of securing themselves. These means were in their own hands. — They held Trichinopoly, and had only to Consent to its delivery to the Mysoreans to obtain compleat repayment of all their dues, and Security for the Continuance of their Trading Interests.

If this was liable to objection, they had it in their option to retain such a Portion of Country as would have been adequate to their demand, and, after all, a Provision might have been made for the Nabob, which, although it would Considerably have Curtailed the Authority, which he wishes for, would have liberated him from his Enemies, and have left him in a more exalted Condition than he would, long ago, have been reduced to, had he been without the aid of the Company.

Instead of adopting such a Line

of

of Conduct, or making their own welfare a primary consideration in effecting a peace, we find that the only basis upon which they would agree to it, either in the negociation in which they had fruitlessly been employed with the French, or those afterwards carried on with the Mysoreans, was the Nabobs compleat establishment.—

It does not appear that any Impression was made by these offers, although the Mysore Vakeel at Madras gave Government to understand that they would, in great part, be accepted.— But while this Negociation was going on, the two Companies at home had a Treaty to undertake their endeavour in effecting a Peace. To this purpose it was necessary to put an end to the Ambitious Schemes of Mr Dupleix, by the appointment of a man of Moderation as his successor — But, should this fail, the English Ministry had determined to interpose with a National Power, by sending out a Fleet, and one of his Majesty's Regiments. Success attended these measures, and, after some discussions which are not material to be stated, relative to the Basis upon which

the

been engaged. But had the Measures which go verned them tended to an aquisition of Territory many opportunities offered of gratifying their wish in the Compliatest manner. Instead of acting like rapacious auxiliaries, grasping at Power, their Views were directed to procure the blessings of peace to Contending Nations, to give permanence to the Nabobs Government, to procure the repayment of the Sums they had advanced, and to return, after the accomplishment of these wise and benevolent purposes, to their original avocations, as far as the protection indispensibly requisite for the Country would admit — It has already appeared that they refused the Nabobs offer of this Country, and preserved in resisting every subsequent temptation which was held out to excite a Desire of Dominion, —

Although every day and every Circumstance conspired to induce a change in this resolution, yet their firmness could not be shaken, and their Conduct, at the present Crisis, bore the strongest testimony to their good faith that could have been given. If, when they

just took the Nabob under their protection, an opposite conduct would have been inconsistent with that rectitude of intention which should have actuated all their measures, they had not now to seek for any excuse. — Their Affairs were deeply involved, and, if not speedily relieved, threatened with absolute ruin. — The Nabob had not only confessed, but long manifested, that he was positively unable to contribute, in any Degree, either by Troops, Money or Influence, in carrying on the War and after the exertion of all these means, for him, by the Company, the possibility of establishing his Government seemed to be as far removed as ever — He had risked nothing, he set out upon a Speculative Idea of succeeding his Father, founded upon the advantage which he thought the Turbulency of the times would give him, and the preference with which he might flatter himself in the Soubahs choice, because the other party had set himself up in opposition to the Laws of Indostan. The Company on the other hand, had risked an immense property, for the recovery of which they looked to the Country, and, for this reason, had obtained from

Dillaway.— and the preliminaries to the afsion of Trichinopoly were, that the Mysorean should join in settling the Nabob in his Government, that he should proceed upon the Marhattas to do the same, That he should, from this time, defray the whole expence of his own and the Marhatta Troops— That he should secure the whole debt due by the Nabob to the Company— That he should pay the Nabob a Sum of Ten Lacks of Rupees, and assign him such a Fort and District in the Mysore Dominions, as should yield an annual Revenue of 2 Lacks of Rupees.— That he should grant to the English an Exclusive Trade in the Mysore Country, That, upon his agreeing to, and performing, all these Articles, the Fort of Trichinopoly should be delivered over to him, within the Space of 12 Months, during which time it was to be garrisoned solely by English Troops, that the possession of it should be guarranteed to him by the English, that the Rajah of Tanjore should be secured in the peaceable possession of his Dominions; and, lastly, that all the Contracting Parties should enter into a Alliance mutually to defend each others possessions

This fully evinces the fidelity of the Company's attachment, who, with a magna

nimity

magnanimity, of Conduct to which a Parallel will not easily be found in the Political intercourse of mankind, took the Nabob under their protection, when extreme poverty seemed to shut out every hope of relief; when he was destitute of every other friend, and when his pretensions, disappointed of the assistance of Nazer Jung, were, if not extinguished by the Death of that Prince, long disputed by a Superior Competitor, who, with the assistance of the French, threatened them with total annihilation — at this time they came forward without asking for, or meditating, any Benefits, but such, as, ultimate success and his own Gratitude might be expected to confer on their Commercial Concerns. Although the grand pursuits of this Commercial Body suffered materially from the violent and bigoted of their Political and Military Operations, in extricating the Nabob; Yet the Suspension of Mercantile Affairs was never for the illaudable purposes of designing policy, or thing to aggrandize itself, by the distress of the times. — Since they disavowed from the beginning, they were averse, to any deviation from the peaceful occupations which they had so long and successfully

been

he depended entirely on the English for Infantry and Artillery, and on the King of Tanjore and Tondiman for Cavalry and Peons — The latter of these had joined him out of pure friendship, and to the former he had promised a Mortgage of the Madura and Tinnevelly Countries, if Peace was effected by his means, but, on return, was to obtain the ancient dependencies on Trichenopoly of Dindigul and Dendigul — The Country was soon involved in the same miseries from which it was expected the late successes would have given it permanent relief; and the expence of defending it once more devolved upon the English, who were equally destitute now, as before, of any other resource than their own Funds afforded; for, on a recommencement of Hostilities, they had the mortification to find that, notwithstanding the Improvement which they had every reason to suppose the Nabob's finances had undergone, he refused to appropriate them to give Energy and Stability to his own Government — His debt amounted to the immence Sum of upwards of 25 Lacks of Rupees, and was increasing at the rate of 1½ Lack p^r^ Month — Peace might be obtained, but, by a Sacrifice

which

which neither the Nabob nor the English could re-
:concile themselves to make viz.t the Surrender of
Trichinopoly the Fort although, on this condition, the
Mysoreans would agree to pay the Nabobs Debt to
the Company, Yet, so long as there was any probabi-
:lity of his establishment in the Government, they
inferred reumbursement from himself, and to fav-
:ours to support him in all his pretensions. But
advices had been received of an intended invasion
by Salabat Jung, which rendered it indespensably
necessary, by some means, to terminate the War,
and to save a part, rather than lose the whole.
Negociations were set on foot, which, as was before
several late defeats of the Enemy, and particularly
the Destruction ones to the French, would forward
The particular objects of these, were, if no attempt
that would be accepted, to represent the inability
of the Company to support so expensive a War, to-
state the exigency of the times, and to persuade
the Nabob to yield to the Mysoreans, terms of
accomodation, under certain restrictions and advan-
tages which would Counterbalance the Cession
of the Important Fort of Trichinopoly. — a Deputa-
tion was accordingly sent to treat with the Del
:aware

"long as they remained easy. That he had agreed con-
"stantly to defray the Batta and Extraordinary
"charges, Yet that had never been done. What-
"ever excuses he might before make, there could
"be no reasonable plea now; and it was intole-
"rable, that the more places they took for him
"the more their expences encreased". and he was
desired to give positive orders to the Renters which
he had left in the Management of the Inost
Country for the punctual provision of the
Current expences of such places as he had been
put in possession of, and further to appropri-
ate whatever part might be thought equitable
towards discharging his Debt.

The attention which had been shewn
to the Nabob, when it was known that real distress of
mind, has already been manifested, but, to forbear
requiring what might in gratitude and Justice to have
suggested itself to his own mind, would have been Im-
prudent, and indeed the severe distresses of the Company
and their Troops would not admit of it. The Nabob
sent orders upon his Amildars for 5 Lacks of Rupees,
but they always evaded payment, and, after a lapse
of several Months, alledged, that his Brother Abdul
Wahab

Mahabut Caun had extorted such large contributions as to make them quite unable to answer any new Demand. — It was evident that Collections were made from the Country; and, as they were made by those who ought to have interested themselves for its Tranquility, Government had the more just reason to complain that they were not applied to the Publick exigencies. — This called forth very serious attention; for, if they were to be equally unsuccessful in productive, as in unproductive times, and a new War was undespon-sibly to Commence, it became requisite to know what other resources could be really depended upon; they had resigned all hope of receiving any thing from the Guest Province, and they experienced equal difficulty in prevailing upon the Nabob's Relations to join the Force which they had collected. The Nabob was therefore unequivocally called upon to state whether he Could support the expen-ses of the War; whether he could bring a sufficient Force to the Field: — and whether he had ten any and what Steps to secure the assistance of the King of Tanjore, and Tondeman: To both he plainly answered that he had no money to defray the expences of the War — that

he

that they might have been satisfied to have commuted their original Claim for some adequate Compensation which would not have been so injurious to the Nabobs affairs — But, independent on a reliance on their own Strength, they were encouraged by the influence of French Councils, and the resort which they might have to French assistance to persist in requiring a Rigid Compliance with the first terms — The English Government had then not only to combat the objections of the Mysoreans themselves, but to prevent any effectual operation on them, by the secret Machination of the French — Every means were used to accommodate the dispute, and to prevent its bursting out into open rupture, at the expiration of the term fixed for the surrender of Trichinopoly Fort, a Sum of Money was offered, and the Mysore Vakeel sent for, and strongly urged to use such Representations to his Master as would bring about a placable Adjustment of the matter, but all was to no purpose, for nothing less than the possession of the Fort, Trichinopoly, would satisfy — The reasons already assigned precluded Government from giving any hopes that their mediation would,

be

be used towards effecting it, and it was therefore resolved to support the Nabob in his Right and pretensions to the entire Government of the Carnatic, and give him all possible assistance agreeable to Treaty, but at the same time "to neglect no prudent measures to keep fair with the Mysore King and Marratas" which however was rather to be hoped than expected; During these Important discussions the Nabob availed himself of his emancipation from the Walls of Trichinopoly, and marched towards the Northern Province, to raise money from the Tributaries, and establish his authority, where it had not yet been fully recognized. The first considerable Contribution he levied was a sum of Three Lacks of Rupees from the Polledar of Wandewash, Yet, after all the praysing entreaties of Major Laurence on the part of Government, he would consent to apply but the small proportion of 40,000 to the Compagnys relief upon such Conduct Government could not help observing "that, although he "pleaded poverty, they were well assured of his "Collecting large Sums, but that he took no "thought to reimburse them, nor would he so

long

unsuccessfully attempted to gain their acquiescence to a
qualification of the previous terms of this agreement, by
offering to give up the Revenues without the Fort;
but the concession of the one was not secure without
the other, and the Nabob very well knew that by
acceding to the Surrender of the Fort, he virtually
gave up all the Madura and Tinnevelly Countries
He then pretended that the obedience he owed to the
Mogul would not justify his alienating so consi-
derable a portion of his Dominions, But these rea-
sons were insufficient to satisfy the Mysoreans,
and he, at length, was negotiated to sign an
Agreement to give it up at the expiration of
two months — with this reservation, which he de-
clared to his Friends in whose presence he put the
Seal, "That he had neither design nor Right to
"give away the Fort and Country which belonged to
the Mogul" — For the final arrangement of this
Business he depended on the English Government
to whom he sent Powers to negotiate with the Dallaway
of Mysore — This threw them into a most embarrassing
Situation — They had just reason to complain of
his abuse of their confidence, yet saw how incompa-
tible such a mutilation was, with the Nabobs good
and how necessary the preservation of the Country in

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an entire state and to secure their equitable Claims for the vast sums of Money which had been lent to them — But the attainment of these desireable ends was rendered almost Impracticable, for, on an Investigation of the Treaty — although there appeared to be plausible reasons on both sides, yet much of the difficulty in adjusting their different Claims was to be ascribed, to that want of precision in all Eastern agreements, which leaves it in the Power of the Strongest side, to give them such Construction as best suits its convenience. — The Arduous task then which Government had to perform, was, if possible, to induce the Mysoreans to accept of an equivalent to avert the ruin of the Nabob, which must inevitably have followed the cession of Trichinopoly — On either side the prospect was alarming, a Decided refusal must have involved them in a new War, for which the state of the Country was particularly unfavourable, and the temporizing expedient just agreed upon, only retarded, for a short period, the Evils which, on every account, were to be prevented — although the Mysoreans Idea of Right was most perversely strengthened by the value of the acquisition, Yet had they been left to themselves it is possible

that

Mysore Regent, who had promised to advance him money, but I do not find that this promise was adhered to — a speedy termination to all embarrassments was, however, confidently expected by the late War, and measures were considered for establishing the tranquillity of the Country, and reducing the seditious Polygers and others, the only step apparently necessary for fixing the Nabob in the Government — But he shewed a great reluctance to leaving Trichinopoly, and protracted his departure and that of the Army, by frivolous excuses which could not be put in competition with the real benefit that would immediately result from a prompt decision of Conduct, by availing himself of the first respite of Peace, which had been allowed him, to remove every obstacle to a full acknowledgement of his authority, before the French had time to recover from their late misfortunes. But what was the surprise and mortification of the English, when they discovered that these excuses were founded in a desire to evade the Terms of a private Treaty between him "him" and the Mysoreans, for the alienation of the valuable districts of Trichinopoly, as the price of their

assistance

assistance. — They [the Mysoreans] were much incensed by his subterfuges, and contended, that as they had acted by the condition on their part, they had the most equitable grounds for demanding their reward. The Nabob, on the other hand, set forth his Claim, to their assistance until he should be firmly established in his Government, which could not be said, so long so long as nearly the whole Arcot Province was in a State of Rebellion — This argument was not admitted by the other Party, who observed that the Extension for their Services might, by such Pretences, be so continually delayed, as never to be received: because similar grounds for objection would never be wanting — The truth is that Hiedar Aly now so completely overthrew the Nabob's Enemies, that he acquired a confidence in his own Strength, and was unwilling to part with so considerable a Possession, moreover, as one grand obstacle, in the Composition of Chunda Saheb, was removed, he felt more competent so long as he had the assistance of the English, which he had effectually secured by the heavy debt they had suffered him to encrease to them, to overcome every other, either by his Superior force or by an application of temporary expedients — &c.

unsuccessfully

Government, the designs of the French were thereby defeated, and Mahomed Ally was relieved from the dread of an enterprizing Rival — He thankfully expressed his acknowledgements for the benefits they had brought him, which indeed was no more than Gratitude imposed upon him to shew, that he was not insensible, of the hardships which they had suffered during a long and severe conflict — The difficulties which Government experienced in money matters, were very great The Nabob, having been deprived of the Revenue of such parts of the Southern Countries, as had once been in subjection to him, could at any time give but very scanty supplies to the Army, whose expences were consequently supported by Government, which caused the first contraction of this debt to the Company, and which, although it has fluctuated, has never been cleared off. so soon as the indication of his inability in this respect appeared, a promptitude in remedying it was shewn on the part of Government, which no untoward circumstance ever checked, and, at this period, their advances from made the Considerable Sum of £2,000,000. barely leaving sufficient to answer the monthly expences

expences of the Presidency — The Arcot Province was in a great measure, reduced, and the Nabob had sent thither his Brother Abdul Wahab Cawn, who, with a force he had collected, it was believed was levying considerable contributions, it was therefore very natural to expect, that some part of them at least, should be applied to replace the heavy draughts which had been made on the Company Treasury, and representations were consequently made to the Nabob, who sent orders to appropriate some of the Collections to that purpose, but it was in vain, for Abdul Wahab Cawn would contribute nothing, nor would he pay any part of them even to the Detachments of the English troops, by whose assistance they were made, and who were therefore necessitated to draw their monthly Pay and Batta from the Presidency. This strongly marks that check which the Nabobs success would have met with, even from his own relations, and the turbulent spirit which would have broke out upon every attainment of insufficient independent power, had it not been curbed by the awe in which they were held by the Superior force, and unfeigned attachment of the English — He had given reason to hope for relief from the Mysore

derived from their Junction, except the Tanjore Horse appears to have been the apprehension which their formidable Numbers, rather than their skill in War, excited — But, by whatever means terror was infused into the opposite party, good effects were experienced; Chunda Sahib's army was held in Check, and the English troops were more at liberty to oppose the French. Successes fast followed each other, and, notwithstanding the many efforts M.r Dupleix made to reinforce the French party, they were constantly defeated. —

The face of affairs had thereby so totally changed, and the Nabob's Enemies began to feel the consequence of a scarcity, almost approaching to Famine, discontent crept in among them, and they were unable to make any effort to extricate themselves, Chunda Sahib, apprehending his own danger, meditated escape, but was taken, and his tragical fate every compassionate mind must reflect upon with horror — The French were then left to themselves, and closely pent up within the Walls of Seringham Pagoda — It was resolved to attack them, but the effusion of blood was prevented by a previous surrender — By the Bravery of the English Troops, and the steady attachment of

Government

It is unnecessary to detail all the measures which were adopted to promote the attainment of this object, or, rather, which could not have been dispensed by the sun, were uniformly shewn for prosperity, the same friendly and faithful attachment accompanied him throughout all the vicissitudes of fortune, which he underwent in the course of this contest for Empire – He was told that the sole object of Government was to place him on the Government of Oude from which they never were diverted, nor Orlando, on their account, either by prosperous or adverse events.–

They however found that themselves alone, were unable to gain any permanent advantage over the united force of the Dutch and Chundu Sahib, while the Dutch and their own troops, assisted by a Bengal Detachment, were employed against them, Repeated applications had been made to the Nabob of Tanjore, but without effect, to your Father, and the Nabob had, very early, applied to the Mahrattas for their assistance to the same effect, but, for a long time, without success for the present it was disposed that they should have some Recompense, which it was not in the power to give – at length – they were prevailed upon, by the means to which he fled and to them, and their Country upon the Nabob – The only essential service, they

derived

deriv'd from their Enemies, except the Tanjore Horse appear to have had the apprehension which their formidable Numbers rather than their Skill in War, excited— But by whatever means terror was infused into the opposite Party, good effects were experienced. Chunda Saheb's Army was held in Check, and the English Troops were more at liberty to oppose the French. Successes fast followed each other, and, notwithstanding the many efforts Mr Dupleix made to reinforce the French Party, they were constantly defeated.

The face of affairs had hereby so totally changed, and the Nabob's Enemies began to feel the consequence of a scarcity, almost approaching to Famine, desertion crept in among them, and they were unable to make any effort to extricate themselves, Chunda Saheb, apprehending his own danger, meditated escape, but was taken, and his tragical fate every compassionate mind must reflect upon with Horror— The French were then left to themselves, and closely pent up within the Walls of Seringham Pagoda— It was resolved to attack them, but the effusion of blood was prevented by previous surrender— By the Bravery of the English Troops, and the steady attachment of

Government

to deliver over the whole of his Countries to the Company's sole disposal, provided they would allow him an annual Income of 2 Lacks of Madras Pagodas, and that he could fix his Children and Heirs to the agreement for ever – the same Generosity which had marked the measures of Government not to take upon themselves the Character of Protectors of the Country and withheld them from demanding any Stipulations in their own favor, previous to entering on it, was here more eminently distinguished – For of Right was this due to them, as no doubt it was, for not insisting on a participation of the advantages that might be gained, for not inquiring as a preliminary, the Reason of any Territory, either as Security or Reward – How much more laudable was their conduct upon this occasion, when they declined the acceptance of any Profit, in preference to avail themself of this offer on the part of the Tabob Tho' circumstances had urged them to it – They knew how to preserve inviolable their Reputation for uprightness, which, in those days, was proverbial and to trust to the Nabobs Gratitude for remuneration when he should be liberated from his difficulties, and be free back from the importunate impulse of his minds. –

With the Nabobs request for a Stipulated monthly Loan of 1½ Lacks of Rupees it was not possible to comply, because Government could not depend upon

having

knowing it. They however continued to assure him of support, and neglected no opportunity of promoting his interest, on the contrary every means that could be suggested were exposed, to disconcert the Operations of his Enemies, and plans were formed, and executed for diverting their schemes. By this Vigilant care and Zealous Exertion, the Province of Detroit was so far recovered as to encourage the Board to appoint managers for the Collection of its Revenues. The advantages gained about this time although they did not altogether relieve his pecuniary wants, yet however his Hopes and dispatches the melancholy thoughts which had occupied his mind, so far, that he wrote, expressing a very lively gratitude for the efforts that had been made in his favor; confessed that his stay in the Province was then entirely owing to the friendly assistance which he had given to him, that his whole dependence was on the English, whom he looked upon as the only friends in this world, and on whom he confided for every thing that might be conducive to his Happiness above his security. These sentiments could not fail of giving satisfaction, assured him that their force was exerted wherever it might be in his power to make return for the Services done to him in the days of his adversity.

11

these would Leave — That, in the course of the Events which succeeded, they were solicited to attach themselves more closely to the Nabob, that an apprehension of danger to their connexion conspired with the urgency of his Entreaties to induce an accession to this proposal, and that, in consideration of the Grant of the Jaghire of Poonamalle, they commenced the quality of allies, by binding themselves to furnish an European force, and to provide their monthly pay, but that the Nabob was to defray all Contingent charges That they had not long acted in this Capacity when the Nabob was likely to be overwhelmed with misfortunes, by a combination of Enemies, whose united force he had not the means of opposing, and, representing his distresses to the Company's Government, prevailed upon them to take under their Sole protection his self and Country, on which they succeeded in a manner most honorable to themselves, and made sure to the present and future Welfare of the Nabob —

It is now my purpose to shew in what manner they conducted themselves in their new Character, and how they decided on my duty, that is imposed on them — The Nabob, previous to the first grant of supporting them, expressed his great apprehensions, and observed that, since they had received this assurance, he should think, he [illegible] but how to act against the Enemy,

Their first attention was given to measures for counteracting

countracting the designs of Chunda Saheb and his Allies the French; a supply of Recruits having lately arrived from Europe they were enabled to fit out a force to watch their motions which, as soon as Dupleix was known to be their Object, was ordered to March thither; and being Superior in Cavalry, to endeavour to bring them to Action; they however made their way good to that place, and commenced its Siege. —

The Nabob's Alarms on this event were con-
-siderably encreased, and, notwithstanding the overtures was in his favor, he was again desirous of coming to an accomodation with his Enemies, but was however dissuaded from such a measure. His pecuniary embarassments soon became pressing; the little Revenue which he had formerly collected from the Southern Countries was, by this Circumstance, diminished and rendered so precarious as to put it out of his power to make any advances to the Army. This, added to two or three unsuccessful excursions, presented no bad a prospect before him, that, in a fit of despondency, he formally proposed Retiring from the Country, and to resign all pretensions to it in favor of the Company. He wished to borrow an immediate sum of money, and also assured of being furnished with Rupees 1,50,000 monthly for the Charges of the Army, for the security of which he was to mortgage any part of the Northern Circars hereafter to be ceded Countries but if this offer should not be accepted, he commu-

might prudently be rested on drawing what they had to
lose, the ruin their Trade, which might suffer a temporary
suspension, but the restoration of it, from its extent and
Consequence, would become a national concern, as we have
seen has been the case with regard to the French — The
second bound them only to furnish Troops and to discharge
their monthly pay, every Charge attendant on their
being employed in the Field or in defence of the Nabobs
Garrisons was to be defrayed by him, as well as the
Expence of Military Stores — But these conditions on the
part of the Nabob were impossible, he was threatened
with irretrievable Ruin if they were insisted upon, and
must consequently relinquish every hope of any thing but pre-
-haps a bare existence — He threw himself at the mercy of the
English; desired them to declare their sincere and true
Resolution, and he would act accordingly" — Compared their
Same for truth and Honesty to the Brightness of the day
and as in reality he found it. —

No longer confining themselves to the letter
or even to the Spirit of specific agreements, the agents of the
Company became unmindful of the wary prudence
of Merchants, they disregarded the bare execution of
the Conditions, which they had imposed upon
themselves, and which only the Nabob could justly
Claim

Claim – they took him and the Country under their sole protection, they promised to guard the one, and to defend the other; to furnish men, Money and Stores – Fair, unfavourable to the interested Policy which would have suggested the Security of some important Benefits to itself, They took no advantage of the Nabob's distress, they made no Stipulations in their own favour, Craving what in strict Justice they could demand, the reimbursement of all extraordinary Charges, that might be incurred in the course of the war; Upon these terms they undertook to fight the Nabob's battles, and, from this time, we must consider the Company as having left the Character of Allies, and become the Guardians of, Himself and his Country

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2nd The Conduct of the Company in the Character which they adopted as Guardians and Protectors of the Nabob and his Country –

In the foregoing Head it has been shewn in what manner the connexion between the Nabob and the Company originated That the desire of the latter to ingratiate themselves with him and, if possible, by such casuals and timely good offices as they could render gradually embroil their affairs in the disputes of the Country Governments, hoping to reap advantages to their trade, from the favourable impressions which these

as Superintendants and Guardians of the Company's Interest and Rights - Answers had, by this time, received from the Court of Directors to the 18th... which communicated the assistance first given to the Nabob. The Conduct of the Governor and Council was therein approved, as having been prudent, and the Result of the necessity of the times - and, in Return, the Company hoped that the Nabob would have a due sense of the Services done him on this occasion in case of his being made Nabob &c at the same time a cautionary injunction was given "never to have any Concern with the Country Government disputes, if they could, consistently with the true Interests of the Company avoid the same." - This Caution likewise implied a discretionary power to adopt similar measures upon a similar occasion - and, as the reasons by which first dictated and caused them, existed more forcibly at present, one obstacle was overcome, Viz.: the doubt they before entertained of the light in which their Agency in the present disputes might be considered by their Superiors - Still an alteration would be made in the conditions upon which they then agreed to take a part - at that time the whole Expence fell upon the Nabob; the Investment was carrying on and the most important Concerns of the Company attended to. now the whole Expenditure was to be borne by the Company; what would otherwise have been employed in procuring Exports for the European Market, would now be diverted to the support of

the War, and the recovery of the Sums expended on it depends solely upon the successful issue of it — If misfortune should ensue, the whole would be sacrificed. —

Such were the considerations which offered themselves upon the present critical period, when the line of Conduct which might be Resolved on, would probably decide the future fate of the Company — to avoid the evils required the first care, to gain permanent advantages and rewards was an Object which would hereafter attract attention should success attend the measures now to be adopted. —

In conformity with the assurances already given, and notwithstanding the utter inability of the Nabob, candidly avowed, in any shape to contribute towards his Establishment in the Government of the Country, he was told that he should receive the Assistance of Government to the utmost extent of their power, He was exhorted to rely upon the sincerity of their Friendship, and to conduct himself out of the reach of danger, so long as he made the Attachment of the Company and possession of the Fort of Trichinopoly. —

From the merit of a conduct so generous and honorable, let not the Company's own detractors nor the relative one in which they stood with the Nabob in consequence of the grant of Poonamallee, detract the first called upon them to contribute no more than

merit.

He had lately received from the Government of Madras the strongest professions of attachment and support, and relying on their sincerity, laid open to them his situation with a candour that, while it gained their commendation, secured them to his Interest.

He stated the terms which had been offered to him, but said he had deferred his final answer until he should have consulted with the Government, who, by their Friendship and Union, were entitled to it. He pointed out the consequence of Negotiation, which would be immediate War, and loss of resources by depriving him of the Revenues of the Country. He confessed his not having money to support the Expences of a War, and that his sole dependence for the means of carrying it on, must therefore be on the English. That, if they would furnish Troops and supply the Expence of them, together with all warlike Stores, and he should obtain Victory and possession of the Country, he would pay their Debts with the Revenues of it. But, if they should be unable effectually to assist him when his Enemies should have marched against him, it would go hard with him, for he could not then avail himself of the present favourable Offers. He therefore sent to

his Servants that he might be informed of the sincere
design and resolutions of Government, recommending the
fullest Consideration of what he had written.

The terms him proposed were of a most discouraging nature, the Nabob's property, had reduced him to a state of Total inaction - he had neither influence to draw to his support the Subsistances of the Country, nor money to pay them, had he so provided - He had recourse to foreign powers, but neither the force of Example and immediate advantage were requisite inducements. He probably knew that the situations of the English would be perilous precarious by the Success and Designs of the French, and that it was therefore necessary they should endeavour to disappoint them, which was the case, but singly to oppose a Confederation which was both superior in Strength and fruitful in resource, with a very circumscribed force of Europeans, and a doubtful dependance for the means of paying them, upon the remittances from England, and of subsisting them, upon the casual supplies which might be collected from the Country by hazardous incursions, should they once Commence open hostilities, were impediments not easily to be reconciled. Yet to be subdued by the bare appearance of them without making any effort, would have been inconsistent with the duties of a Commander,

sent to the province of the Soubah, the answer made
to this was "Our troops shall on no account
"Considerably paid their wages by us" The letter only
"remains, as per list, which I hope you will consider of."

It is not material to enquire
whether Government was, at that time, aware of the con-
sequences which they brought upon the Company by
the acceptance of a defensive advantage for an offen-
sive aid — These were the terms upon which it was
understood on both sides, that the Grant was given
and upon the same terms the Company, throughout,
performed their Engagements —

The Nabob expressed his very great
satisfaction with the arrival of this Detachment, and
desired that his own Affairs and the Company's might
henceforth be considered on the same Light. He was,
in return, assured by Government that no assistance
should be wanting, on their part to promote his pros-
perity, and the sequel will evince how fully they
acted up to their assurances After the Apajeena
tion of Sagur Sung, the French, on the part of their ally
Chunda Saheb, were induced to negociate an
a commodation with the Nabob, and offered, if he
would by surrender Trichinopoly, to grant him Pitta tever
ton

terms he might ask — The Consequences, to the Nabob had he accepted of this offer, and the intentions of the Punch in making it, were too obvious to be mistaken — Trichinopoly was the only refuge in his possessions, and had he parted with it, passive Submission to whatever his Enemies prescribed was unavoidable — Besides he would have had no Security to prevent his falling into the hands of Chunda Saheb, who, it is probable, was too fully aware of the danger to be apprehended from the existance of a Rival, not to take the most effectual measures to obviate them — Yet the alternative seemed but to afford the means of protracting what, in the ends, would prove the same — Chunda Saheb would, of course, endeavor to obtain, by force, what he could not by Stratagem or Persuasion — He already possessed the whole Province of Arcot, and the Reduction of Trichinopoly would have given him all the Southern Provinces — In this Choice of difficulties it was not easy for the Nabob to determine — By acceding to terms of accomodation, Under a qualification of the first offer, he might insure his Persons Safety, although he must have Relinquished every prospect of governing the Country; but, by Rejecting them, he trusted every thing to the issue of War, who he he had, at the means of carrying on —

[illegible] their letter [illegible]

It was fortunate for the Nabob that, at this period, the assistance which the late revolution has given the French on the Coast excited the apprehensions of Government, and consequently made them enter more readily into an alliance which might eventually restrain the encroachments, evidently meditated upon their Trade, both parties were thus actuated by powerful motives which urged them to contribute the means which they respectively possessed, in providing for their mutual Security. The English had not yet received any answer from the Court of Directors to letters which communicated the first assistance they had given to the Nabob, nor could they might be determined on their future conduct, whether delay in resolving would have been imprudent or an immediate adoption of decisive measures would have a less fatal tendency than a cautious forbearance. It was therefore readily agreed to send a Detachment to the Coast [illegible] assistance, and to endeavour, by every means, to discover the French measures as much as possible. The Company's sentiments should be [illegible] the people of men was the Government's [illegible] effecting the security of the [illegible] from war the Nabob's [illegible]

"probable that no dependence was placed in the
promised Grant of Coromandel, for he was told that
the Expences of the Detachment was to be defrayed by him
soon after, however, the Grant was sent, purporting it was
given "On condition that he" [the Governor for it was
made out in Governor Hoyer's name] "should join and
act in conjunction with me." [the Nabob]; with true
faith and sincerity of heart, in quashing, and
quelling, the disturbance of the Enemies in the Circars and
Tschnopoly Countries and defend and take care of Tschen-
opoly Fort."

After the junction of the Detachment,
the Commanding Officer having applied to the Nabob for
money to defray its Expences, the latter addressed Govern-
-ment, observing that, "after the promises made by the late
"President [Mr Hoyer] and Council Major Lawrence and he
"Ambaji Pundora to Nazir Jung to grant all the assistance
"in their power to decide any Disputes that might happen
"between Europeans and the Circar, in consideration of
"having a Firmaun given the Company for the Coromandel
Country [he was surprized, as he had sent it, they should
"desire him to be at any Expence for the Troops in
"paying their Batta" and desired they might be sent

sued for from the Soubah, but which he now sued he
lodged in the hands of a substantial Merchant at
Arcot to be delivered on the Commencement of his Govern-
-ment, and transmitted a Soucar Bill for Rupees 20,000
to defray the Expences until the time that they should
be able to collect the Revenue - a force was accordingly
sent to act with an Army which he had collected of
his own; but, after their junction, the Nabob could not
be persuaded to adopt active measures; the consequence
was that fatal disorders crept in among the Europeans,
which, together with the heavy charge of field Equipage
and other necessaries, rendered it impracticable to con-
-tinue the Campaign, and they were ordered to retire.-

A Total defeat of the Nabob's troops
ensued, and he himself got the hazard of his life, -
escaped to Trinjenapoly, finding himself in no
[illegible] his Enemies having possessed themselves of the
Chunam Kotah belonging to it, he removed to a greater
distance. -

The Assassination of Nazir Jung soon
after brought on a succession of new Calamities, and
threw the Country into additional Confusion, but
now the Enemy and their Allies are decided, and,
by the present irresistible superiority - For this
Event

Event, which made Mayapha Sing, Salabat Jung's Vizier, to
their influence uncontrouled, and they gave law to every
part of the Deccan – They immediately availed themselves of
their advantages by proclaiming Chunda Saheb Nabob
of the Carnatic, and their determination to support him
in it – The gloom which, by this circumstance, had
thickened over the Nabob's affairs, precluded every hope
of relief. All spiritual assistance had been withheld from
the Quarter on which he had firmly founded his Expecta-
tion, and this late disaster precipitated into a situation
worse than before, for, without retrieving one advantage
he had expended his Treasure and a total dispersion of
his Army had taken place – The English remained yet at
Spectators of the transactions which were going on since
this late defeat, but were disgusted both by his behaviour,
preceding that occasion and his subsequent want of Faith
regards to the Grant of Divanalloo – However, he still
hoped that he might recover their favourable disposition,
by the same means which had once procured it, and
the impression, a distant time promised the Gain, of
they would defeat him – But the face of Affairs had
considerably changed, and the important events which had hap-
pened rendered consequences to the Loss of the Lots and
Trade, which, if not prevented by [illegible]

of restoring tranquility to the Country by reconciling the discordant Interests which distracted it, was attended only with disappointment to all parties. The English Govern-
-ment obeyed his summons to send all the force they could assemble against the common Enemy and deputed an Embassy to compliment him on his arrival with an offer of very valuable presents — The Embassadors were instructed to represent that the hope of his favourable attention to the Company had occasioned the services done to Mahomed Ally, and, as the zealous aid which had been given to the Cause, by his recommendations, merited some reward he was reminded of a promise which had a few years ago been made by his father while at Fort St. George to grant the Company an exemption from inland duties, but that some accident had prevented the Phirmaun being drawn out which he was now desired to execute, and further to bestow on them a grant of the Coromandel Country —

The Governor in Council prosecuted their readiness to contribute towards the general defence of the Province, but they expected some reciprocal return for the Expences which this measure would put them to — Nazir Jung amused them

with

with promises to settle their Affairs for some time, till he was about to move to Arcot from Pondicherry when the Enemies of the force which had joined his Army became so considerable as not to justify its continuance any longer in the Field without means equivalent to its support The Ambassadors were thereupon decided to refuse to let it accompany him, unless he acceded to the terms required. To this preliminary he gave no answer, and the Detach-ment returned to Fort St. David.—

Mahomed Ally was nearly [illegible] successful in his application, Nujeer Jung having taken no other step to establish him in the Government of it than by giving him a Dismissal, after possessing him-self of the person of Nazuphka Jung he seemed no longer to take any concern in the Affairs which [illegible] proposed had brought him into the Carnatic.—

All the Subahs [illegible] to [illegible] effected, and on the night of the Eleventh [illegible] Pondichery, he was reduced to the necessity [illegible] applying to the English, as his only resource, [illegible] them in Checking the progress [illegible] Sahib and the French were making [illegible] Nujeer Jung's Victorious Army, [illegible] a Guard for the Personalities [illegible]

Company in Return. How the communication terminated can be gathered only from Allusions to it in the Subsequent Letters and Ondultations. The Nabob however expressed his dissatisfaction with the promise given to the Vakeel on the part of Government, to do all the Service in their power.

In consequence of this promise which, as he observed, at the verbal, he deemed irrevocable, he now urged the performance of it, He repeatedly & earnestly urged that he had been able to maintain his ground only by the aid which had already been granted to him, solicited a continuance of the same good will, that had been so manifested, and Repeated his Assurances of equitable benefits to the Company; both for himself and Nazer Jung, to whom he had represented, in the most favorable terms, the Service which had been done to him.

The Governor and Council have not yet been prevailed upon to engage so warmly in the present contentions, the Result of which must be uncertain, as to deserve being thought Allies to the Nabob or to injure their affairs, whatever deviation have been made from their Usual peaceable Line of Conduct were only with a View to the improvements of the Company's mercantile Concerns, and those assurances stimulated them to greater exertions. The situation of the —

continuing

contending parties was become too critical to be void of much deliberation, or a previous regulation of terms. The approaching arrival of Nagor Sing was anxiously expected as the Event which was to Crown the promised Rewards, and to Neglect the Opportunity which that might afford of procuring relief to their inland trade, by assuring support upon the present occasion, was considered imprudent. It was therefore resolved as Chunda Sahib might dispose every thing before the arrival of Nagor Sing, unless Mahomed Ally was Appointed, to send him a Detachment of as many men as could conveniently, spared" and to Comply with any Reasonable Request for Stores, all of which were to be entirely at his Expence. — .

This timely assistance secured the Society of Tanjore; for, upon Chunda Sahib and Morapha Sing's hearing of it having arrived safe they were diverted from their projected Attack and made an Attempt on Tanjore —

The Bravery which the Europeans acted on the Occasion and the desultory Manner in which they Carried on were more dispersed to be Dreaded by the enemies among the confederates for Power, than the Sepoys Skilled with Bows and the others with Assemblies the Approach of Nagor Sing to Trichinopoly

seclusion by the uncertitude of the future Events, which might follow, and also unaccompanied by assurances of adequate troops to be procured from Nazer Jung, as well as some sense of immediate danger was not apprehended, as his Enemies were at a distance, and it was thought that the detachments of European and descriptions Sepoys, already sent to his Relief would secure the Capitol of Pudcherypoly until Nazer Jung should arrive. But a sudden alteration of circumstances encreased his fears and induced the English to adopt more effectual measures.

By an unaccountable infatuation Chunda Saheb and his ally Mazuphier Jung had suffered Nazer Jung to join his Enemies in the Carnatic Province and to collect his Forces and Operations which formerly they had endeavoured to prevent a temporary subsistence for their Army. Success which they met with on leaving Conjeveram the defenceless Country, produced a disposition adverse to more active Measures, or else they were desirous of reserving their whole Strength to repel the formidable and long expected Army of the Soubah, whatever their motives might be, their Conduct was equally Ruinous to their real Interest, and favorable to the preparations of their Enemies. The Fort of Arcot could no longer be supplied from a Quarter which their enemies could only be tributary to

to Tinnevelly desolate and in productive ruin, as the motive by which their followers were actuated, was the hope of gain, & the means of gratifying it were to be sought for, and could be obtained only by more hazardous and enterprizing Undertakings – the most probable of success was against the Poligar of Warriorpoliam, whom they attacked, and with some difficulty and after considerable delay, obliged to pay his contribution.–

It was reported that their real object was Trichinopoly, upon this the Nabob's Nabob were invested with double force, and, in the most urgent Language, he entreated further reinforcement, . . . Especially that, to effect it, the Company's Garrison should not be left destitute of defence – while he reproached the pru- dential care of Government for the Safety of their own possessions, he held out a promise of benefit to the Co., saying that he had already sent a Gen. to for Tinnevelly and would send one for Trichinopoly as soon as he received a proper Assistance.–

It is to be observed that the Nabob had already taken the precaution of sending a Vakeel to Madras to Communicate per- sonally with the Gov. on the subject, & of the Appearances which in his opinion to prevent all of the intentions towards us.

Copy

Europeans were sent, and, as a token of the good Will of Government, it was resolved to compliment Him with the Present of the former, and to decline his Offer of monthly pay to the Latter, who were only to be Supplied with Provisions.

This ready compliance encouraged the Nabob to solicit a further supply of Naval Stores, the Expences of which he would take upon Himself, observing, "before this Letter came, I was doubtfull whether you would be backward in assisting me I requested of you only the assistance of the Gunners &c. afore-mentioned, but since you wrote me Shewing your Readiness to comply with the Rest, I am now encouraged that you bear a true regards to Major Lawrence & will give me more Assistance."

This request was also granted as far as Circumstances would admit; and, a Peace having been effected in Europe, he was supplied with the desired Stores, which had been loaned to the use of Gov. during the War, and with 30 Europeans, under the Command of an Officer - but he was to furnish their pay according to a List which was sent to Him.

About this time an Insurrection had risen in the English Settlement of Madras -

From

from the French having possession of St Thomé; whereby Provisions were stopped from Coming to the former place It was therefore represented to the Nabob, and a Grant of it requested and obtained for the Company which expressed that it was given on condition "that they (the English) cook and join us with a force and other necessaries whenever they may be Called for upon the Circar's business" but it is to be observed that this Stipulation was inserted by the Nabob without his having applied for the consent of Government; Indeed it cannot be supposed that for such trifling consideration, they would bind themselves [illegible] so indefinite; nor does it appear that the Nabob [illegible] notwithstanding he had expressed himself to that effect, ever asked for assistance on any other conditions than [illegible] the Expence of the Troops which might be [illegible] him.

This [illegible] of good offices [illegible] mutual confidence in both parties from which each [illegible] expected to reap advantage. The Nabob wished to [illegible] alliance of the English, who, on the success they [illegible] given him, looked [illegible] hereafter be established [illegible] Government [illegible] applications were [illegible]

[illegible]

Circumstances connected them with events / at that time little expected / which took place After a Lapse of 3 yea
It is sufficient, for the present purpose, to have proved that the English did not receive the assistance from the Subah Nabob which they had a right to expect, which was promised, or which, it is asserted by the present Nabob, and his friends, was given to them, — On the Contrary, a dependance on his word involved them in almost irremediable misfortunes, from whence he left them to extricate themselves —

Upon the Death of the Nabob Anwer ud Deen Khan, the battle of Ambour, on the 21st July 1749, the present Subah fled to Trichinapoly — His fathers Army was dispersed, the Cause of Chunda Saheb was basely espoused by the French, and he saw himself surrounded with difficulties, and destitute of the means to overcome them — His elder Brother had been taken Prisoner and the pretensions of Chunda Saheb / a relation of the late Reigning family / to the succession were as good as his own, but more likely to be established, since they were supported by a victorious army, ample Funds, and powerful Friends: among the contending factions which now struggled for the predominancy in an ascendancy in the Empire of the Carnatic, —

Mahomed

Mahomed's ally stood single, unsupported, either by
summons, which should give him present table, or secure to
assist him till he could obtain one from Delhi; circum-
scribed within the walls of Tuckinapoly, his only prospect
was to defend that place with the few adherents whom
he could collect, until time, or some favorable Circum-
stance, should effect a change, that would enable him to
make more vigorous Exertions.—

In this impromising situation of his
affairs, no Chance of effectual Relief alone remained;
and that was the assistance of the English, to procure
very soon. After his Arrival at Tuckinapoly, made application;
but the moderation of it shews that he was dif-
fident of success; for he must naturally have concluded
that his father's desertion of Fort St George and Fort
David, was still strongly impressed on the minds
of the Sufferers. Yet, extraordinary as it may appear,
he founded his expectation upon the Services which he
had rendered at the Gallon place. He observed that,
not being much in need at present of assistance,
he requested only "some Guns and mortars with your
Europeans" urged Government "to give their
service" and hoping that they would, if no more,
assist him in any [illegible]

on the Coast – The bad condition, however of its fortifications the want of a sufficient quantity of stores &c for the subsistence of the Garrison, and the loss of nearly the whole of their Treasure, were but ill Calculated to make a stand against a successful Army, which, in comparison with the number of English Troops now remaining the French force might be called, and a Command of money which enabled them to satisfy even the avaricious disposition of the Nabob Anwer ud Deen Khan –

Madras fell in the beginning of 1746, and on the 15th end of that Year, Anwer ud Deen sent his Army, under his two Sons, Mafhooz Caun and Mohammed Ally Caun, proceeded to Pondicherry – The Governor at first & David awaited themselves of this opportunity by a Treaty of Neutrality on enforcing an observance of the same by the Garrison of Madras, and by that to the Nabob promised both, But, after having remained there near 3 Months, received a sum of 5 Lacks of Rupees from the French, and suddenly decamped – All entreaties against this desertion of ours were ineffectual It was in vain to offer any considerable sum of money, for this could not have been given, if it could, would have been settled by the French. The Brothers of Mafhooz Caun and Mahomed Ally Khan

Khan however intimated that a present of Pagodas 6000 would engage the stay of the Army a few days; no reasonable means were to be disregarded which promised to ensure their safety, and this sum was sent - but proved insufficient, for, under a pretext of the Expence they had incurred, but in reality founded upon by French money, they prepared to move away The Governor of Fort St David made another effort by offering to pay them Rupees 2000 a day, if they would remain 10 days longer again unsuccessful, he made an offer to their friendship by laying Open to them the Destitute of the Settlement, the Sacrifice it would become to the French, if their protection was withdrawn, and promising the Continual Gratitude of the Company if they would confer this signal mark of favor - All was fruitless: present gain predominated in distant advantages; and their determination to leave the place to its fate was irrevocable A few days after their departure the French left Pondichery, directing their march towards Fort St David, but, before they could reach Valdaour, their Schemes were disconcerted by the arrival of an English Fleet - A minute investigation of the transactions of this period, is not [illegible] Parliament [illegible] was indispensable because [illegible]

Circumstances

effected the security of the French Settlements, while he was in no condition to defend them, probably communicated his plan to his Superiors in Europe, and solicited a Force adequate to the Execution of it - For the Year following brought him out a supply of Troops, with which he began his measures, by an Attempt on Fort St David, but in this he was disappointed by the appearance of an English Fleet and was moreover advised against it by Mahfouz Caun, the Nabob's eldest son, who also Recommended to the English not to resent the insult - This Recommendation was at that time equivalent to a Command, and was implicitly obeyed -

The English, lulled into Security, by an Apparent impartial superintendence of the Nabob over both parties instead of harboring an intention to disturb the peace of their Neighbours, had not even Garrisons up to provide against the Possibility of an Attack themselves -

But Mr Dupleix now ceased representing that their views were numerous, while, at the same time, with the most consummate Artifice he held out allurements for them to commence Hostilities in hope of their incurring the Nabob's displeasure under specious pretences of guarding against Re-

measures, which he feigned to apprehend were meditated against Pondicherry he now forwarding his plan for the Capture of Madras taking care to engage off the departure of the English Fleet his Troops landed, and in a short time became Masters of the place — with it there was good reason to suspect — the Nabob Anwer ud Dien Khan had been bribed to allow.—

Thus, while the English confided in repeated assurances of protection from the Government of the Country, they were abandoned, without an Exertion in their favor, to the mercy of their Enemies, and suddenly plunged into the deepest distress: the loss of a vast quantity of Treasure, a Valuable Cargo of Cloths, and all their Shipping, were not the only Calamities which had befallen them — They had just grounds for suspecting that the mask of friendship was worn but to conceal a conspiracy, with their avowed Enemies, to compleat their destruction — and protect that being the attempt made by the Nabob to secure the person and friendly intercourse which immediately followed the return of the Fleet to Coromandel, seems to confirm the suspicions of the insincerity of his professions.

Fort St. David was now the only remaining place of safety to which the Fugitives could fly for

any material molestation — On the Contrary so universally was their Suffered Silence an Intimation, either an account of the Commodities which an importation of the Spices every where dispensed by it, that it never was thought necessary to secure a continuance of the Privileges which they enjoyed, otherwise, than by a trifling complimentary present, until that general Revolt of all India, which, involving every native Government, and Alarming every European Settlement, gave a turn to Eastern Politics — This, followed by a train of unforeseen Events, gradually drew them from their tranquil pursuits, and ultimately compelled them to engage in the turbulent Scenes of War

The circumstance which produced this change was the independant Spirit exerted in the Provinces of Hindostan by the distraction into which the mogul Empire was thrown by the invasion of Nadir Shah — But what more immediately affected the Carnatic was the murder of Dost Mahomet, the mercenary but lawful Nabob of Arcot, and the Usurpation of a Stranger to succeed him — in exclusion of his real Descendents of the Ancient Ruling family — A decided Opposition to the Will of the Usurper was however by no Calamities under which the Country & its Princes to suffer and whose influence has not

yet been extinguished.—

Mr Dupleix, Governor of Pondicherry, was desirous of turning the animosities which began to appear, to the advantage of the French nation, but saw the necessity of preventing every probability of a rupture between the English and French, suggested to his political genius the Capture of Madras, but having given Symptoms of his designs, he apprehended that they might be prevented by a similar measure on the part of the English against Pondicherry— his Solicitude increased on Account of the expected Arrival of an English Fleet on the Coast, which could give them a decided Superiority. he therefore had the address to insinuate into the minds of the Nabob Anwar ud Deen Khan, the Father of the present Nabob Jaffer Ally Khan, the Justice of the present Nabob's being deprived of a more specific Description, and of the Hostile Intentions of the English— The Nabob wrote to the Government of Madras intimating his having Heard of the Arrival of an English Fleet was expected, but that it would be proper that their Views should be explained on the Receipt of which Measures for forbidding any attack against the French—

Mr Dupleix having [illegible]

of Fulas

in the Course of the War –

To the more easy connection of my judgement, should be necessary, & for the more ready connection of those who may be inclined to concede with it, I shall seperately give the Documents and Passages from the Records upon which it is founded.

1st The Origin and nature of the Connection between the present Nabob and the Company. The improvements of that Connection into an Alliance, and finally the Causes which terminated in the latter, & to bring the protection of him and his Country upon the Coast.

In treating of this head it is necessary to take a short review of the Situation of the Company, and their Affairs on the Coast previous to the events which induced and espousal of the Nabob's cause.

I find that in the year 1748 their Settlements were confined to Factories for carrying on trade, their Territory extending no further than the Spot on which they stood, except at Fort St George and Fort St David where a few inconsiderable Villages had been granted to them by former Governors of the Country. The Port of these places was the Residency from whence all their

their Investments were shipped for Europe As Trade was the object of their Institution, their endeavours were confined solely to its advancement – Their Means for carrying it on being derived from Imports of home manufacture and large Quantities of Gold and Silver Bullion, converted into the Coins of the Country, together with a Revenue of between 70 and 80 Thousand Pagodas pr Annum drawn chiefly from a Duty levied on the Commerce which resorted to their Ports – While observing of this quiet and honourable Employment their Expences were small, and Emoluments great, the Company was enriched at home, and the People of India participated in the consequent demands for their Commodities, at the same time beholding, with wonder and Applause, the integrity which pervaded all their dealings, rendered more prosperous when contrasted with the low, mean and faithless Rapaciousness, which Characterized the Indian Governments.

As Wealth did their thoughts turn to more extensive possessions, that they convinced themselves about the Country Governments only, & beyond mentioned the Changes which had been effected in them; and, notwithstanding the frequent wars in which they were engaged, their Revenues seldom met the

persons to which they respectively relate, that I do not hesitate to pronounce them the criterion to which both parties may mutually, and with safety, refer their Claims.

On perusing the Minister's remarks delivered to Messrs. Sandberg and Woolf, I imagined that this correspondence between him and Government, on the dates he generally, seems to set, would afford sufficient information relative to the subjects which that Correspondence regarded and that it might be necessary to know only the Arguments which were opposed to his, to determine which party carried with it the most weighty reasons — but, in the course of this perusal, I observed such a Chasm of retrospective allusion, that I could obtain no satisfaction without going back to the Spring from whence we had risen and this I found to be the first connection between the Court and the Conspirators.

Having informed myself of the Original and pursued its progress through the various transactions to which it has branched out, and, as an acquirement of knowledge, the grand object is to discover the first principles whereby effects may be explained and understood, the primitive alliance between the Prince Esterhazy connexion, and the Highness Mesmer / Archduke of Austria and their subsequent transactions may be ascribed,

and

ed on this ground alone, the Equity of the greatest part of them is to be determined.—

It will conduce much to the elucidation of the subject for discussion, by giving a comparative view of the State of the Company's Concerns on the Coast, so far as they related to that connection with the Nabob which supported him in adversity, established him in his Government, and protected his Country. The general arguments which will arise from this Arrangement of the matter will facilitate the Conclusions to be drawn from particular points to be afterwards related, and I think that the whole may be comprised under the three following Heads.—

1st The Original Nature of the Connection between the English East India Company and the present Nabob of the Carnatic — the improvements of it and entering into the Alliance, and finally, the Causes which have led on the latter, tending to protection of him and his Country upon themselves —

2nd The Conduct of the Company in character protected, adopted, & Guardians & Protectors of the Nabob and of his Country.

3rd The Conduct of the Company & the Nabob relative to the Debt which has been contracted

[illegible]

Orginal Plan

As we have been disappointed in the
disposition which might naturally have been expected on
the part of the Nabob, to promote an adjustment of the
Account between him, and the Company, the production of
which he has represented at home as a subject of great
grievance to him, inasmuch that, notwithstanding our
repeated desires that he would afford us an Opportunity
of receiving personal Explanations from his own Mouth,
he would not even understand our meaning to whom
we addressed our several Letters to his Vakeels - We
had no alternative but to search for other Sources from
whence we might draw the information requisite to de-
furnishing the materials for guiding the Governor
General in his Decision -

The Boards of Government [illegible]
suggested themselves to our minds as the only means to
which we could have an adequate Knowledge of the Re-
sources from to which present themselves to us, from
which we do not know whether we may not expect, the
Nabobs backwardness or acquiescence to our proposals of
him by his Vakeel Hoosun, whether such an Inquiry may
be dissatisfactory and I see cant be fully heard at the
Durbar

Brought over Pagodas 37,29,506.24.13

V By Grain Issued to Col.e Edmonstone Commanding Officer at Palamcotah as p the Account & Vouchers under the Seals & Signatures of Tirmalapah Broodely & Vittarapah Broodely - - - - - - - 17,030.

By Grain Delivered at Palamcottah as p Receipts - 6,225.22.0

By do — do - as p the Killadars Account - 641.4/ 21,096235

By Grain Delivd at Villapore as p Receipts for - 1,13,364

Also 3,62,0 other Receipts - 1,85,8/0

By do do as p Account & Vouchers attested by the Killadars & Durogahs & delivered by Nizamudeen Khan Mahomed Shayer Subhan Nurrain Seeds, Mahomed Ally Khan & Shayer Coppergee - - 1,47,474.16.5

2,32,577.22.5

W Deduct Credit given in the Superintendants Account under the head of Vellore - 630.20.15 231,739 3 10

By Cattle Delivered at Different Times by Great Vakeel now to Col.e Stewart, to the Commanding Officer at Porto Novo, M.rs Torres at Chinglepat Enquiry Shodayapah & the Commanding Officers at Permacoil - - - - - - - - 46,90 - -

X By an Error Charge in the Tapial Account - 1,22,030 - -

41,47,032 14.30

Brought over Pagodas 369,1,144.31.66

1782
May Nº 1. By a charge of Moguel Horses disbursed at Madura — 1937. 6. "

By sundry Disbursements charged to the Assigned Revenue as paid to His Highness the Nabob's Garrisons of Nellore Trichinopoly, Madura Dindigavanum, Palanary &c — 49,402.22.50.

By the amount of Disbursements charged by the Military Paymaster 1511 . 15.44

By the amount of a charge made for the Troops of His Highness at Nellore — 1,732.25.40.

By the amount of Money said to be paid to Moguel Cavalry at Madura and Pallamcottah — 5,732.13.10

By amount charged to the Assigned Revenues account for Sundry disbursements for account of the Garrisons of Nellore and Trichinopoly — 13,424.22.13

By amount charged as the Military Paymasters Expences on the Nabobs account — 154.27.60 141,744. 17.43

1785
May " 1. By amount charged to have been paid to the Troops of his Highness at Nellore 1260 . 15. "

By amount charged to have been paid to the Moguel Cavalry at Trichinopoly 2287 . 21.10

O By the amount of Horses charged to have been purchased at Trichinopoly 630 . " "

P By a charge of Interest 15,332 . 10.60

Q By a charge of Batta lost 1140 . 11.36

R By Charges of Military Paymaster on His Highness's account 1253 . 26.20.

N. 1 By charges made in the Assigned Revenues for Tinnivelly Trichinopoly Madura and Palnaud — 6500 . 13.67

2 By a charge of Pay to Armed Peons on account of Arrears previous to 31st August 1781 — 909 . 3.62.

3 Dº Dº Madura for Independent Peons 1337 13.60

4 By the Charge of a Loan advanced on account of the Cavalry 2,19,313 . 6.14

S 5 By Horses purchased by the Company 14,060 . 24.51

By Cash received upon the Assigned Revenue and carried to His Highness's Credit — 20409 . 23.32

T By an overcharge in the Disbursement of the Current Charges from the 1st May 1780 to the 30th of June 1785 the charge made by the Company amounting that hours being 2,356,300 whereas the real Amount at 360,000 Pags. P Annum amounts to no more than the Sum of 126,0000. which being deducted leaves in favor of His Highness a Balance of — 496,300 . 6.26.

Carried over Pagodas 3729536 24.13

Dr. His Highness the Nabob Wauluajah, Nabob &c. &c.

1791

Septbr. 9th. To Balance Struck this day, in this Separate Account — 7,33,941 23/24